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DUE  PROCESS  OF  WAR
Nathan S. Chapman*
The application of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the government’s
deprivation of rights during war is one of the most challenging and contested questions of consti-
tutional law.  The Supreme Court has not provided a consistent or historically informed frame-
work for analyzing due process during war.  Based on the English background, the text and
history of the U.S. Constitution, and early American practice, this Article argues that due process
was originally understood to apply to many but not to all deprivations of rights during war.  It
proposes a framework for analyzing due process during war that accords with this history and
suggests useful principles for the “war on terrorism.”
First, all deprivations of rights during war were subject to the law of the land.  During a
state of war, rights were determined by the law of war, treaty, and statute.  The President had no
constitutional authority to deprive persons, including enemies, of rights contrary to that law.
Second, many deprivations of rights during war were also subject to the Due Process Clause.  The
courts in England and the United States provided a number of judicial remedies to enforce the
law of the land.  Americans understood these remedies to be a requirement of due process.  Impor-
tantly, those courts provided such remedies for many deprivations during war.  English and
American courts considered habeas petitions for enemy noncombatants; considered trespass suits
brought against military officers by enemy noncombatants for deprivations of liberty and prop-
erty; and reviewed the application of military law by courts martial.  When such deprivations
were within the jurisdiction of a federal court, they were subject to due process of law.  Third,
many deprivations of rights during war, though subject to the law of the land, were not subject to
due process.  The deprivation of rights of enemy combatants on a battlefield and the deprivations
of rights of civilians by an officer exercising statutory authority to enforce martial law were subject
to the law of the land, but not to due process.
© 2018 Nathan S. Chapman.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame
Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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INTRODUCTION
The application of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment dur-
ing war is one of the most important, challenging, and debated questions in
American constitutional law.  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not pro-
vided a consistent or coherent analytical framework.  In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
the Court’s most recent case to directly address the issue, a plurality applied
the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test to determine the “process of law” that
was “due” to a U.S. citizen detained in the United States as a terrorist.1  In
Boumediene v. Bush, the Court held that the privilege of habeas corpus
extends to enemy aliens detained as terrorists at a U.S. base in Cuba.2  This
ad hoc approach has provided little guidance to the executive or lower
courts, and the guidance it has provided is pernicious.
Consider the government’s approach to targeted killings.  When Presi-
dent Obama announced that he believed the Due Process Clause applied to
the targeting of a U.S. citizen suspected of terrorism,3 the Department of
Justice (DOJ) analyzed the constitutional question according to the plural-
ity’s decision in Hamdi.  After concluding that the Due Process Clause may
apply to such a killing, the DOJ dutifully applied the Mathews balancing test
to conclude that the executive department’s internal checks and balances
provide the “process of law” to which a target is “due.”4  The notion that the
Due Process Clause’s procedural due process requirement is satisfied without
any judicial process threatens to dilute its protection across the board.5
The scholarly responses to the DOJ’s analysis illustrate the lack of con-
sensus—or theory, even—about how the Due Process Clause ought to apply
during war.  Some scholars argued that the Due Process Clause does not
apply to the exercise of war powers; others took no position on whether the
Clause might apply during war but agreed with the government that it had
satisfied whatever the Clause might require.  Some argued that the Clause
1 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509, 529 (2004) (plurality opinion); see Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
2 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008).
3 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Defense Univer-
sity (May 23, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-
president-national-defense-university (“I do not believe it would be constitutional for the
government to target and kill any U.S. citizen—with a drone, or with a shotgun—without
due process . . . .”).
4 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A
U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED FORCE
5 (2011) [hereinafter DOJ WHITE PAPER] (assuming the Due Process Clause applies);
Memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Attorney Gen.,
Applicability of Federal Criminal Laws and the Constitution to Contemplated Lethal Oper-
ations Against Shaykh Anwar al-Aulaqi 38 (July 16, 2010), https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/
olc/aulaqi.pdf (determining that the Due Process Clause “likely” applies).
5 See, e.g., H. JEFFERSON POWELL, TARGETING AMERICANS 143 (2016) (arguing that the
DOJ’s theory, if extended, would “evacuate[e]” due process “of its traditional and settled
content”).
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required post-hoc judicial review of a targeted killing, and others that it
required judicial review before the killing.6
The most thorough, historically informed approach to rights during war-
time has focused on the principle of reciprocal duties arising from the law of
nations and the common law.  A subject owes a duty of loyalty to a sovereign;
in return the sovereign owes that subject the protection of the laws.  Accord-
ing to Philip Hamburger, resident enemy aliens were not traditionally under-
stood to be “subjects” entitled to the protection of the law.7  Enemy aliens
anywhere, and nonresident aliens outside the United States, enjoy no consti-
tutional rights.  While this framework is based on an important principle of
the common law that informed the way American jurists conceived of rights,
the categories it proposes are not supported by the text of the U.S. Constitu-
tion or the way that American jurists implemented it during the early
republic.8
This Article proposes a different framework.  Based on the English back-
ground, the text of the Constitution, and early American debates and judicial
decisions, it argues that Americans understood all deprivations of rights dur-
ing war to be subject to the law of the land.  Many, but not all, of those
deprivations were also subject to due process.  The detention of prisoners of
war and the deprivations of rights on a battlefield and pursuant to a lawful
declaration of martial law were subject to the law of the land, but not to due
process.  All other deprivations of rights that fell within the jurisdiction of the
courts were subject to judicial review—even during war.  This was due pro-
cess of war.
The key to grasping the due process implications of early American dis-
cussions of law, war, and rights is to unpack the concept of “due process of
law” within Anglo-American constitutionalism.  Americans equated due pro-
cess with the traditional requirements of the “law of the land” clause of Chap-
ter 29 of Magna Carta.  In English law, the “law of the land/due process”
requirement merged two concepts that were conceptually distinguishable:
the requirement that deprivations of rights be according to law, and the
requirement that they be subject to judicial procedures.  In most cases, these
concepts overlapped.  The government could only deprive someone of a
right according to lawful authority, while a court stood ready to enforce the
law.  Writs of habeas corpus and prohibition and damages suits against
officers were routine judicial procedures for meeting the requirements of
Chapter 29 of Magna Carta.  Americans inherited this understanding of “law
of the land/due process.”
War introduced a wrinkle.  English and American jurists agreed that
deprivations of life, liberty, and property during war were subject to the law
of the land.  Under the law of nations, war changed many individual rights
and duties.  England had adopted the law of nations as part of the law of the
6 See infra Section I.A.
7 Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823, 1833, 1860–64
(2009).
8 See infra Part III.
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land.  Moreover, many governmental deprivations of life, liberty, and prop-
erty during war were governed by statute, the common law, or royal procla-
mation.  In England, and later in the United States, the deprivation of rights
during war was therefore subject to the law of the land.  In this respect, Chap-
ter 29 of Magna Carta applied to deprivations of rights during war.
The due process, or judicial procedure, component of Chapter 29 of
Magna Carta, however, applied to only some deprivations of rights during
war, and the government enjoyed more leeway to restrict those procedures
during war.  Courts continued to supply habeas corpus, including to enemy
aliens, but Parliament could suspend habeas for limited periods during war.
Prize courts supplied elaborate civil-law procedures to enemy aliens and neu-
trals in prize cases.  And officers remained subject to suit for trespass.
Yet many deprivations of life, liberty, and property during war, though
subject to the law of the land, were not subject to due process.  The depriva-
tion of rights on the battlefield or pursuant to a lawful declaration of martial
law or the suspension of habeas corpus were not subject to judicial review.
Prisoners of war (POWs) were not entitled to habeas, but those detained as
POWs could use habeas to challenge their status.
Americans inherited and amplified the English tradition of ensuring
that deprivations of rights during war were subject to the law of the land.
The U.S. Constitution gives all of the federal government’s power to change
rights during war to Congress, ensuring that the definition and authority to
deprive persons of those rights would be according to law.  The Constitution
permits the government to suspend habeas and to authorize the quartering
of soldiers but only upon certain limited conditions.  The nation has all the
powers necessary to implement its rights of war under the law of nations pur-
suant to its own municipal law, subject in many cases to ordinary judicial
procedures.
Early debates and judicial decisions by many of the luminaries of the
early republic confirm that Americans believed that although war changed
the rights of citizens, enemies, and neutrals, the deprivation of those rights
were still subject to the law of the land, and often to judicial procedures.
Though Americans rarely expressly considered the application of the Due
Process Clause per se during war, they frequently considered the relationship
between war, individual rights, and the law of the land.  John Jay, John Mar-
shall, James Iredell, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and Albert Gallatin
all maintained that deprivations of rights during war were subject to the law
of the land—many of them tacitly or expressly holding that resident enemy
aliens, in particular, were entitled to habeas and postwar suits (at least) to
enforce their rights to liberty and property during war.
The sum of the historical evidence suggests a fresh framework for analyz-
ing the application of due process during war.  A juridical state of war autho-
rizes the government to change the rights of citizens, subjects, and neutrals
under U.S. law.  In particular, Congress may authorize the deprivation of
rights of armed enemies on the battlefield, the detention of POWs, and the
deprivation of rights within the United States pursuant to martial law—all
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without judicial review.  Those deprivations would be subject to the law of the
land but not to the Due Process Clause.9
Many deprivations of rights during war would be subject to due process.
Congress may authorize the suspension of habeas corpus and the quartering
of troops, but courts may review the constitutionality of those acts.  Congress
may likewise authorize the detention and removal of enemy aliens (and it
has, with the Alien Enemy Act of 1798).  But the deprivation of those rights
would be subject to habeas and to suits for damages (if permitted by current
doctrine).  Congress may also enact rules governing the military.  But depri-
vation by court martial outside of a declaration of martial law would be sub-
ject to review by federal courts.
The Article cannot address all the due process questions arising from
the so-called war on terror.  It focuses on the historical evidence regarding
the relationship between war and the law of the land.  Yet this history sug-
gests a framework that offers principles for the war on terrorism.  The key
issues are whether Congress has authorized a deprivation, and if so, whether
that deprivation is the sort for which a person would traditionally have had a
right to judicial procedure.  Targeted killings of terrorists are challenging
because they do not fit neatly into any of the historical categories, but I
believe they are best analogized to the killing of soldiers on a battlefield.  In
this respect, citizenship and location are irrelevant.  Targeted killings of ter-
rorists are subject to law, but not to due process.
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I discusses the current doctrinal
and academic frameworks for analyzing due process during war.  Part II
frames the historical analysis by distinguishing between the “rule of law” and
“judicial procedure” requirements of Chapter 29 of Magna Carta.  Part III
presents the English understanding of the relationship of the law of war, the
law of the land, martial law, and judicial procedures.  Part IV analyzes the
U.S. Constitution in light of the English background and the American expe-
rience during the War for Independence.  Part V explores a handful of epi-
sodes during the early republic in which statesmen and jurists contemplated
the relationship between war and the law of the land.  Part VI suggests some
principles based on this framework for the war on terror.
I. CURRENT FRAMEWORKS FOR DUE PROCESS DURING WAR
This Part critiques three existing frameworks for analyzing due process
during war.  The first is the Supreme Court’s current doctrine, which applies
a balancing test to determine what the Due Process Clause requires.  This
9 Nothing practical turns on saying these are not subject to the Due Process Clause.
One could just as easily conclude that such deprivations are subject to due process insofar
as they are subject to law, though they are not subject to judicial procedures.  Because I
believe “due process of law” refers more specifically to the judicial procedure requirement
of Chapter 29 of Magna Carta, I prefer a framework that clarifies that the Due Process
Clause requires judicial procedures.
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doctrine provides little guidance and has no support in early constitutional
history.
Scholars have suggested two alternative approaches.  The first is that the
Due Process Clause simply does not apply to the exercise of war powers.
While this approach is categorical, and therefore fairly clear, and has some
basis in nineteenth-century doctrine, it has little basis in the original under-
standing and, importantly, fails to account for all the times the courts have
reviewed the lawfulness of governmental deprivations of rights during war.
The second approach has a surer foundation in the early history: based
on the common law and the law of nations, some scholars argue that early
American jurists believed that all enemies (wherever they were) and nonresi-
dent aliens outside the United States were outside the protection of U.S.
law—including the U.S. Constitution.  By implication, of course, this means
that the government could deprive them of life, liberty, or property without
due process.  As we shall see, this latter framework corresponds with general
principles of the law of nations and the common law but fails to reflect the
nuances of judicial doctrine and practice at the founding.
A. Doctrinal: The Supreme Court’s Ad Hoc Approach
The Supreme Court’s approach to due process during war has been
inconsistent.  Consider three data points.  First, from the earliest days of the
republic to the present, the Court has considered the lawfulness of the gov-
ernment’s deprivation of life, liberty, and property during war.10  The Court
has never suggested that the Due Process Clause requires judicial review in
these cases; it has simply supplied it.
Second, in Miller v. United States, the first case to directly address the
application of the Due Process Clause during war, the Supreme Court deter-
mined that the Clause does not apply to the government’s exercise of the
“war powers.”11  The Court cited this as a reason to uphold an in rem judg-
ment against enemy property pursuant to the Confiscation Act of 1862.  As
discussed below, the Court could have—and should have—reached the same
conclusion by reasoning that the deprivation complied with the Due Process
Clause.  (Indeed, this was the view of the Congress that enacted the law.)12
The Court has never expressly rejected its reasoning in Miller.
Third, during the war on terrorism, the Court has used an ad hoc
approach rather than drawing a sharp distinction between war and peace.
The controlling opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld concluded that the Due Pro-
cess Clause applies to U.S. citizens detained as enemy combatants within the
10 See Stephen I. Vladeck, Enemy Aliens, Enemy Property, and Access to the Courts, 11 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 963 (2007). See generally infra Part V (examining such review).
11 Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 304–06 (1870); see also Juragua Iron
Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 297 (1909) (rejecting a U.S. company’s claim for compensa-
tion for property destroyed by U.S. forces in Cuba during the Spanish-American War).
12 See Christopher R. Green, Our Bipartisan Due Process Clause 41–44 (Oct. 25, 2018)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3249845.
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United States.13  By also holding that habeas corpus extends to noncitizen
combatants detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,14 the Court has strongly
suggested that due process does too.15  What process is due?  According to
the Hamdi plurality, whatever the Court decides based on an application of
the Mathews v. Eldridge cost-benefit analysis.16  Either the Court has rejected
Miller’s proposition that the Due Process Clause does not apply to the exer-
cise of war powers or it has carved out a limited exception for the war on
terror.
Relying on Hamdi, the Obama Justice Department concluded that the
Due Process Clause applies to the government’s targeting of a U.S. citizen on
foreign soil who was suspected of being a terrorist leader.17  Most surpris-
ingly, perhaps, the government concluded that the executive department
could unilaterally supply whatever process the Clause requires.18  In effect,
the DOJ lawyers reasoned that their own authority was so convoluted with
overlapping bureaucratic jurisdictions that the executive branch itself sup-
plied whatever checks and balances were necessary to comply with due
process.19
The scholarly response to the DOJ’s argument illustrates the current
doctrine’s lack of clarity and guidance.  Some scholars question whether the
Clause applies to targeted killings at all,20 while others seem to agree with the
13 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion).  Professor Kent
argues that Milligan was a narrow exception to the Civil War–era Court’s view that the Bill
of Rights does not normally apply to the exercise of war powers. See Andrew Kent, The
Constitution and the Laws of War During the Civil War, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1846
(2010) (citing Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866)).
14 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008).
15 See id.; Martin S. Flaherty, Essay, The Constitution Follows the Drone: Targeted Killings,
Legal Constraints, and Judicial Safeguards, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 37 (2015)
(“Boumediene makes clear that due process and habeas are difficult to separate”); see also
Mary Van Houten, Essay, The Post-Boumediene Paradox: Habeas Corpus or Due Process?, 67
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9, 11 (2014).
16 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529; see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
17 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
18 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
19 See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 2. Such overlapping jurisdiction is presuma-
bly different from policy squabbles among career and politically appointed bureaucrats.
See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise,
2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 55; M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of
Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 646 (2001).
20 Noah Feldman, Obama’s Drone Attack on Your Due Process, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 8, 2013),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2013-02-08/obama-s-drone-attack-on-your-
due-process (“The white paper should have said that due process doesn’t apply on the
battlefield.”); see POWELL, supra note 5, at 143 (arguing that the DOJ’s theory, if extended,
would “evacuate[e]” due process “of its traditional and settled content”); see also Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Essay, Drone On: The Commander in Chief Power to Target and Kill Americans,
38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 43, 45 (2015) (“The same Supreme Court decision [Hamdi]
that wrongly seems to make citizenship relevant also seemingly implies, equally wrongly,
that targeting decisions are subject to judicial review or some other form of judicial legal
process . . . .”).
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government that whatever the Clause requires was satisfied by purely execu-
tive branch checks.21  Some argue for judicial review before a killing;22
others for judicial review afterward.23  Dean Trevor Morrison’s qualifications
nicely capture the doctrine’s uncertainty: “The Fifth Amendment might
apply, but the Supreme Court’s explication of its meaning in the domestic
context might not.”24  One might go further—between Miller and Hamdi, the
Court has a range of doctrinal options during war, even for deprivations in
the domestic context.
B. Historical
The plurality decision in Hamdi owed little to history, and, as the DOJ’s
use of Hamdi illustrates, the Mathews balancing test provides precious little
guidance for constitutional decisionmakers when the interests on either side
of the scales are especially weighty.
Several scholars have suggested more historically rooted frameworks for
analyzing due process claims during war.  No historical case is straightfor-
ward.  Americans during the early republic did not directly discuss the appli-
cation of the Due Process Clause to the deprivation of rights during war.
There is no “smoking gun.”  We must therefore infer from underlying legal
concepts and early practices what Americans might have understood the
Clause to require during war.  Both of the historical frameworks proposed by
scholars to varying degrees makes sense of some of the historical evidence,
but neither of them accounts for the nuanced relationship of the law of war,
the law of the land, and due process.
1. The War Powers Exception Framework
The first framework rests on a dichotomy between a state’s “sovereign
rights” and “belligerent rights”: the Bill of Rights applies to the government’s
exercise of sovereign rights but not to its exercise of belligerent rights.
The sovereign-belligerent rights dichotomy derives from the seven-
teenth- and eighteenth-century law of nations.  During peace, sovereigns had
21 See Jack L. Goldsmith, A Just Act of War, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2011), https://www.ny
times.com/2011/10/01/opinion/a-just-act-of-war.html (arguing that “[w]hat due process
requires depends on context” and “these procedures are wholly unprecedented in war,
and they exceed anything the law requires”); see also Alberto R. Gonzales, Drones: The Power
to Kill, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 52–54 (2013) (arguing that the Obama administration did
not supply sufficiently robust executive branch procedures).
22 Flaherty, supra note 15, at 42; see also Benjamin Wittes, On Due Process and Targeting
Citizens, LAWFARE (Oct. 1, 2011, 11:47 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/due-process-
and-targeting-citizens (“I think [due process] requires a strong preference for the capture,
instead of the kill—and it requires the exhaustion or non-availability of reasonable options
either for a conventional trial or for military detention with appropriate habeas review.”).
23 Stephen I. Vladeck, Response, Targeted Killing and Judicial Review, 82 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. ARGUENDO 11, 18, 23–27 (2014).
24 Trevor Morrison, The White Paper and Due Process, LAWFARE (Feb. 7, 2013, 7:53 PM)
(emphasis added), https://www.lawfareblog.com/white-paper-and-due-process.
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certain rights and duties toward one another and one another’s subjects.25
The rights and duties changed when the nations became belligerents.26
Early American courts took account of this principle of the law of nations for
some purposes,27 but there is no evidence that Americans during the early
republic understood the dichotomy to entail that constitutional rights had no
effect against the government’s exercise of belligerent powers.
The first American to suggest this notion was apparently John Quincy
Adams.28  In 1836, he argued on the floor of the House of Representatives
that the federal government could exercise its belligerent rights, which he
equated with the enumerated war powers, to abolish slavery without constitu-
tional limitations.29  Adams’s argument was famous at the time, partly
because it was “shocking.”30  Americans did not widely embrace it until the
Civil War,31 when Charles Sumner, Adams’s prote´ge´, advanced it on the Sen-
ate floor,32 and President Lincoln embraced it as the basis for the Emancipa-
tion Proclamation.33  The Supreme Court then relied on the belligerent-
sovereign dichotomy in Miller v. United States, discussed above, to conclude
that the Confiscation Act of 1862 did not violate the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments.34
H. Jefferson Powell has recently argued that this dichotomy remains the
best way to understand due process during war.  Simply put, it does not
apply.  When the government exercises its war powers, the resulting depriva-
tions of life, liberty, or property may be subject to international law,35 but
25 See EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS bk. III, §§ 69–77, at 509–511 (Be´la
Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds., Thomas Nugent trans., Liberty Fund 2008) (1758).
26 See id.
27 See, e.g., Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 272 (1808) (“[A]dmitting a sover-
eign [France] who is endeavoring to reduce his revolted subjects [in Haiti] to obedience,
to possess both sovereign and belligerent rights, and to be capable of acting in either
character, the manner in which he acts must determine the character of the act.”), over-
ruled by Hudson v. Guestier, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 281 (1810).
28 See, e.g., JAMES TRAUB, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS: MILITANT SPIRIT 438 (2016) (“Adams
appears to have been the first to publicly raise this shocking prospect.”); Kent, supra note
13, at 1845–46.
29 24 REG. DEB. 4036 (1836); see TRAUB, supra note 28, at 428–39.
30 TRAUB, supra note 28, at 438; see Kent, supra note 13, at 1845 n.23 (“The speech was
widely reprinted.”).
31 See JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 204
(2012) (“Building on Adams’ unorthodox late-career account, antislavery men in 1861 and
1862 argued that, properly understood, the laws of war permitted the emancipation of
enemy slaves.”).
32 Kent, supra note 13, at 1845–46 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2964
(1862) (statement of Sen. Sumner)).
33 See TRAUB, supra note 28, at 438; WITT, supra note 31, at 214–15.
34 Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 292–93, 304–05 (1870).
35 POWELL, supra note 5, at 129 n.40; see David Golove, The Supreme Court, the War on
Terror, and the American Just War Constitutional Tradition, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT 561 (David L. Sloss et al. eds., 2011); see also Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.)
37, 43–44 (1800) (Chase, J., concurring).
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they are not subject to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.36
Call this the “war powers exception” framework.
The framework has several difficulties.  First, the constitutional text.
The Constitution does not refer to “sovereign” powers and it has no “war
powers” clause.  In fact, when the Constitution acknowledges that a state of
war may authorize the government to do some things that would ordinarily
be unlawful, it does so expressly.  The Suspension Clause and the Third
Amendment both prohibit the federal government from depriving persons
of particular rights except during war and then only by law.37  As this Article
discusses in more detail below, the Constitution’s text carefully enumerates
and distributes between the legislative and executive branches a number of
powers necessary to begin and fight a war, while likewise distributing to the
judicial branch the authority to ensure that certain rights are respected dur-
ing war.  At the same time, the Constitution carefully enumerates the condi-
tions on the suspension of specific rights during war.38  None of this is
consistent with a binary approach to wartime rights.
Second, the war powers exception framework does not take into account
the original understanding of due process.  As discussed below, early Ameri-
can jurists understood the Due Process Clause to implement the English
requirement that governmental deprivations of rights accord with the law of
the land, and that courts review the lawfulness of those deprivations accord-
ing to established procedures suited to the case.  It was not an all-or-nothing
proposition, i.e., either the government must comply with the full protec-
tions of a common-law criminal trial or it may deprive persons of rights sum-
marily.  It was, rather, an overarching principle that applied to virtually any
governmental deprivation of rights, one limber enough to adapt to changed
legal contexts.  Due process did not require the same procedure for the dep-
rivation of property upon conviction of a crime as it required for the depriva-
tion of property by distress warrant to satisfy a debt owed to the sovereign.39
While the war powers exception framework accounts for the historical evi-
dence that war was understood to change the rights and duties of sovereigns
and individuals, it fails to account for the capacity of due process to absorb
and adapt to those changes.
Third, the war powers exception seems never to have been as extreme in
practice as it was in the Supreme Court’s rhetoric.40 Miller v. United States was
about the constitutionality of the Confiscation Act of 1862 (the “Act”).  The
Act authorized the confiscation of a Southerner’s shares of stock by civil con-
36 POWELL, supra note 5.  Powell allows that the exercise of war powers might be sub-
ject to other constitutional limitations, such as the First Amendment, but does not explain
why the war powers might trump one constitutional right and not another. See id. at 63.
37 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; id. amend. III.
38 See infra Part III.
39 See, e.g., Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272, 276 (1856). See generally EDWARDO COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 50–55 (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1817) (1642).
40 Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268 (1870).
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demnation through in rem proceedings in a federal district court.41  The
question was whether this process violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
The Supreme Court asserted the following:
[I]f the statutes were not enacted under the municipal power of Congress to
legislate for the punishment of crimes against the sovereignty of the United
States, if, on the contrary, they are an exercise of the war powers of the
government, it is clear they are not affected by the restrictions imposed by
the fifth and sixth amendments.42
The Court held that the condemnation provision was “an exercise of the
war powers” and therefore not subject to the Fifth Amendment, including
the Due Process Clause.43
The sovereign-belligerent dichotomy was not the most obvious frame-
work the Court could have used to reach the same conclusion.  As Christo-
pher Green has recently shown, Congress spent a tremendous amount of
time debating the Confiscation Act of 1862 (more than 500 pages in the con-
gressional reports).44  The chief concern was that confiscating enemy prop-
erty that was not directly used in the war effort with an in rem proceeding
would violate the Due Process Clause.  This debate would have been mean-
ingless under a war powers exception framework.  Ultimately, a majority of
the members concluded that the confiscation would comply with due process
because in rem proceedings against enemy property were typical in prize
cases.45  While the Confiscation Act of 1862 applied the principle to property
on land, it was a sensible extension of procedures traditionally used in similar
cases.  The Court itself had relatively recently held that the procedures tradi-
tionally used in a specific type of case satisfied due process.46
The Court’s mistake in Miller stemmed from the way the case had been
litigated.  The litigants had framed the question as whether being an enemy
amounted to a crime, such that the government could only deprive an enemy
of property pursuant to the constitutional requirements of criminal proce-
dure.47  This is why the Court addressed both the Fifth and the Sixth Amend-
ments.  As the Court concluded, crime was a red herring—the Act treated
enemies as enemies, not as criminals.  It was thus correct to conclude that the
Sixth Amendment did not apply.  But it was too hasty to apply the same logic
to the Due Process Clause.  As Congress understood, and as the Court itself
had already explained in an earlier case,48 the Due Process Clause applied to
41 See id. at 293–94, 304–05; see also Confiscation Act of 1862, ch. 195, 12 Stat. 589.
42 Miller, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 304–05.
43 Id.
44 Green, supra note 12.
45 Id. at 41–44.
46 Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276
(1856).
47 Id. at 304.
48 See id.; see also Justices v. Murray, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 274, 276–77, 282 (1869) (invali-
dating part of the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act of 1863, arguably enacted under the war
powers, for violating the Seventh Amendment).
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civil as well as criminal cases, and its requirement depended on the tradi-
tional procedures in similar cases.49
More generally, the war powers exception does not account for the fed-
eral courts’ longstanding tradition of reviewing the lawfulness of governmen-
tal deprivations of rights during war.50
2. The Reciprocity Framework
The current framework that best captures the eighteenth-century history
of the scope of due process is one that emphasizes the reciprocal relationship
between a sovereign and subject.  In short, sovereigns and subjects were
bound by mutual allegiance.  The subject owed a duty of obedience, the sov-
ereign a duty of protection.  The common law distinguished between natural
subjects who owed allegiance by birth and temporary or local subjects who
owed allegiance by residing peaceably and voluntarily within the sovereign’s
domains.  Aliens who owed a local allegiance were entitled to the protection
of the laws, though they did not necessarily enjoy all the rights of natural
subjects (for instance, they could not own land within England).  The princi-
ple of reciprocal allegiance had roots in both the law of nations and the
common law and was reflected in a variety of specific common-law doctrines.
Edward Coke,51 Matthew Hale,52 and William Blackstone53 all attested to the
centrality of this principle for purposes of determining the extent to which a
person was within the protection of the law of the land.54  American courts
and treatise writers often cited these doctrines as part of what we would now
consider the general common law.55
The difficult question was whether resident enemy aliens counted as a
“local” subject entitled to the protection of the law.  An enemy alien was one
who owed a natural allegiance to a sovereign who was at war with England,
for instance a French merchant residing in London when war broke out
between England and France.  In a massive and largely persuasive study that
49 Nathan S. Chapman, Due Process Abroad, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 377, 409–14 (2017).
50 Powell notes that the federal courts are given power to try treason and admiralty
cases, but offers no legal justification for federal courts’ tradition of reviewing deprivations
of rights during war. POWELL, supra note 5, at 79 n.44.  Instead, he suggests that judicial
review of wartime deprivations is “[p]erhaps most important” for “play[ing] an important
legitimating role by confirming the lawfulness of the government’s actions.” Id. (citing
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008)).  It is curious that Powell cites Boumediene,
a case in which the Court invalidated the executive’s actions.
51 Calvin’s Case (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377; 7 Co. Rep. 1a; see Polly J. Price, Natural Law
and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin’s Case, 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 73 (1997).
52 SIR MATTHEW HALE’S THE PREROGATIVES OF THE KING 56 (D.E.C. Yale ed., 1976)
(1640) [hereinafter HALE’S PREROGATIVES].
53 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *354.
54 See PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 203 (2010) (“The
force of this inclusive reciprocity was widely accepted.”); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Whose
Constitution?, 100 Yale L.J. 909, 927–43 (1991).
55 See Kent, supra note 13, at 1857–58 (listing authorities).
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outlines the contours of the “principle of protection,”56 Philip Hamburger
has argued that enemy aliens were categorically outside the protection of the
law.57  The King could voluntarily extend protection to them through procla-
mations, passports, and papers of safe conduct.58  But the presumption,
Hamburger argues, was that enemy aliens owed no duty of allegiance to the
Crown; without express license from the Crown, they were entitled to no pro-
tection under the law.59  Hence, they would not have been entitled to the
protection of Chapter 29 of Magna Carta, which, as we shall see, most jurists
equated with the requirements of “due process of law.”60
Hamburger’s account, as he says, offers “an elegant solution to a wide
range of important problems.”61  Unfortunately, it may be more elegant than
the common law actually was.  To be sure, jurists during the early republic
often cited a principle that enemy aliens were “totally ex lex” without “some
[sovereign] act of public authority that puts him in the king’s peace pro hac
vice.”62  Yet the practice on the ground was more complicated.  John Baker
has recently noted that by the early seventeenth century, the most “orthodox
position” among English common lawyers was that alien enemies “were free
men” under the protection of Chapter 29 of Magna Carta, “but that the lex
terrae [law of the land] restricted the rights of certain categories of people
without placing them beyond the rule of law.”63  As Paul Halliday has shown,
from 1600 to 1800, King’s Bench drew no distinction between enemy aliens
and friendly aliens for purposes of habeas corpus (though they did for pris-
oners of war).64  Even prisoners of war, who were not entitled to be released
by habeas, could use the writ to have their status reviewed.65  Matthew Hale,
in his unfinished manuscript on the Crown’s prerogatives, wrote that “[I]f an
alien enemy reside or come into the kingdom, and not in open hostility, he
owes an allegiance to the king ratione loci, and if he attempt any treason, he
shall be indicted as doing it contra ligeantiae suae debitum.”66  Hamburger com-
56 Hamburger, supra note 7.
57 Id. at 1833, 1860–64.
58 Id. at 1873–79.
59 Id. at 1879–81.
60 See infra Parts II.
61 Hamburger, supra note 7, at 1831.
62 HENRY WHEATON, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF MARITIME CAPTURES AND PRIZES 211
(1815).
63 JOHN BAKER, THE REINVENTION OF MAGNA CARTA 1216–1616, 431 (2017).
64 HALLIDAY, supra note 54 at 206; see also AMANDA L. TYLER, HABEAS CORPUS IN WAR-
TIME 271 (2017).
65 HALLIDAY, supra note 54, at 169; see id. at 172 (“POWs were consistently understood
as being within the protection of a subjecthood that arose from surrender, by which hostil-
ity ceases.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
66 HALE’S PREROGATIVES, supra note 52, at 56.  Hamburger argues that Hale’s state-
ment above, read in context, applied only to enemy aliens with an express license from the
Crown.  Unfortunately, he does not supply a quotation or citation to support this argu-
ment.  Hamburger, supra note 7, at 1877.  To the contrary, the text following the quoted
passage supports its plain meaning: peaceable enemy aliens are within protection.  “But
there are two cases wherein he that is within the king’s dominions owes not an allegiance
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pletely ignores the law and procedures of prize courts as evidence that at
least some enemy aliens were entitled to the law of the land for at least some
purposes (the deprivation of property captured on the high seas).  At a mini-
mum, Hamburger rejects important evidence that resident alien enemies
behaving themselves peacefully were presumed to be local subjects, entitled
to the protection of the law, including habeas and Chapter 29 of Magna
Carta.  This is not to say that the Crown could not authorize the detention
and removal of enemy aliens consistent with the law of the land (and the law
of nations).  The question is whether the legal default, or presumption, was
that resident enemy aliens owed no duty of obedience and therefore were
entitled to no protection of the law.
There is another challenge to incorporating Hamburger’s framework
wholesale into U.S. constitutional law: the U.S. Constitution makes no direct
reference to the principle of reciprocal duties.  The separation of the legisla-
tive and executive powers complicates the question of whether enemy aliens
are entitled to the protection of the law by raising a related one: Which fed-
eral department has the authority to determine the rights of enemy aliens?
The Suspension Clause seems to take it for granted that “the privilege” of
habeas corpus exists without stipulating its scope, and the Due Process Clause
prohibits the deprivation of the rights of any “person” “without due process
of law.”67
Hamburger does not address the specifics of the U.S. Constitution and
how it may have been understood to alter the common law.  Virtually all of
his evidence is from the period before the Constitution’s drafting and ratifi-
cation.68  A number of American judicial decisions during the War of 1812
suggest that at least some jurists believed that the President lacked the
authority to detain and remove enemy aliens without statutory authorization;
Hamburger does not address this implication.69  Rather, he argues that the
Alien Enemy Act of 1798 “explicitly provided some protection to non-danger-
ous enemy aliens.”70  But the Alien Enemy Act did not expressly license any-
one or give anyone rights they did not already have.  Instead, the Enemy
Alien Act authorized the President to detain and remove dangerous enemy
local.” HALE’S PREROGATIVES, supra note 52, at 56.  The first case is when “a foreign prince,
or the natural subject of a foreign . . . prince, not being a natural or acquisite [sic] subject
of the king, comes in hostility within the realm.” Id.  Such should “be dealt with as an
enemy, and not as a traitor.”  The second case is when a foreign king comes into the
dominion without a safe conduct. Id.
67 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
68 For instance, Hamburger details an episode in which Virginia addressed the appear-
ance of several unarmed Algerians during the 1780s.  He discusses the episode as though it
illustrates the American view on “executive power” without discussing whether the U.S.
Constitution should be understood to implement the same view. See Hamburger, supra
note 7, at 1925–29.
69 Id. at 1880 n.191 (discussing Clarke v. Morey, 10 Johns. 69, 71 (N.Y. 1813)); id. at
1895–96 (same); id. at 1896–97 (discussing “the Lockington cases”); id. at 1993 n.515 (dis-
cussing the Williams case).
70 Id. 1895–96.
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aliens.71  As Chancellor James Kent reasoned, the structure and terms of the
Enemy Alien Act presumed that nondangerous enemy aliens were entitled to
the protection of the law.72  Hamburger does not wrestle with this plain read-
ing of the statute.  Moreover, he nowhere cites the leading case of the early
republic to address the issue.  In Brown v. United States, the Supreme Court
held (over a strong dissent by Justice Story) that the President may not cap-
ture, and courts may not condemn, enemy property within the United States
without express congressional authorization.73
While Hamburger’s account of the principle of reciprocal allegiance is
generally historically sound and provides a useful framework for a theory of
due process, it ultimately fails to grapple with some of the most important
evidence of the early-Republic scope of due process during war.  This Article
takes much of the reciprocal duty principle for granted but provides an alter-
native framework for analyzing rights during war by focusing on due process
of law.
II. TWO CONCEPTIONS OF DUE PROCESS
This Article suggests an alternative framework for analyzing the require-
ments of the Due Process Clause by drawing a conceptual distinction
between two historical requirements of due process: that deprivations of
rights must follow the law, and that deprivations of rights are subject to tradi-
tional judicial procedures.  This Part introduces that conceptual distinction.
Subsequent Parts show how the distinction makes sense of the Anglo-Ameri-
can tradition of due process during war.  All deprivations of rights during war
were subject to law, and many, although not all, were likewise subject to judi-
cial process.
A. Distinguishing the Rule of Law and Judicial Procedure Requirements of
Chapter 29 of Magna Carta
American jurists in the early republic took their understanding of due
process from the English Constitution.  According to common lawyers such
as Sir Edward Coke, “due process of law” was synonymous with the require-
ment of Chapter 29 of Magna Carta that “[n]o free man shall be taken,
imprisoned, disseised, outlawed, banished, or in any way destroyed . . . except
by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land.”74  American
71 An Act Respecting Alien Enemies, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798).  The contemporary
version of this statute is 50 U.S.C. §§ 21–24 (2012).
72 See Clarke, 10 Johns. at 70–72 (Chancellor Kent wrote the majority opinion). But see
Hutchinson v. Brock, 11 Mass. (10 Tyng) 119, 121–22 (1814) (arguing that enemy aliens
were not presumptively licensed).
73 Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814); see infra Section V.D.
74 The provision was Chapter 39 of the 1215 Magna Carta, and Chapter 29 in the 1225
and subsequent versions. See BAKER, supra note 63, at 2–3; COKE, supra note 39, at 50;
Magna Carta, c. 29 (1215), reprinted in A.E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT AND COM-
MENTARY 43 (1964); see also The Statute of the Twenty-Eighth Year of King Edward III 1354,
28 Edw. 3 c. 3 (Eng.), reprinted in 1 THE STATUTES OF THE REALM 345 (photo. reprint 1963)
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constitutions used “law of the land” and “due process” clauses interchangea-
bly and American jurists generally drew no distinction between the two
requirements.75
Yet the due process/law of the land requirement of Chapter 29 and the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment merged two conceptions of law-
fulness.  The first is a generic requirement that deprivations of rights must
comply with law.  For this reason, by the early seventeenth century, English
common lawyers believed that the law of the land requirement of Chapter 29
was tantamount to a statutory guarantee of the rule of law.  Accordingly,
jurists could claim that any act of an official was subject to the law of the land.
Such a claim evoked Chapter 29 without necessarily invoking it as a legal
requirement.
The second concept bound up in due process/law of the land language
owes more to the requirement of due process of law.  This was the require-
ment that a deprivation follow certain traditional judicial procedures or be
subject to review according to such procedures.  The origins of this concept
are the fourteenth-century due process statutes which referred at the time to
particular writs for review by the courts at Westminster.76  By the early seven-
teenth century, common lawyers understood these statutes to elaborate, clar-
ify, or establish the requirement of Chapter 29 for certain kinds of cases.77
This “judicial process” requirement included the rule of law require-
ment but added institutional and procedural requirements that the depriva-
tion be subject to review by a court according to the procedures appropriate
to the case.78  By the late seventeenth century, the Crown-in-Parliament
could alter judicial procedures, or create a new court with new procedures,
but the Crown, acting alone, could not abrogate the traditional judicial pro-
cedures without violating Chapter 29.79
The rule of law and judicial procedure conceptions of the law of the
land requirement usually overlapped in practice.  Criminal punishment was
(1810) (providing that “no Man of what Estate or Condition that he be, shall be put out of
Land or Tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to Death, with-
out being brought in Answer by due Process of the Law”).  Some historians have ques-
tioned the extent to which Coke overstated the equation of “due process” and “law of the
land” requirements. See Keith Jurow, Untimely Thoughts: A Reconsideration of the Origins of
Due Process of Law, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 265, 272 (1975).
75 Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers,
121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1713–17, 1723–24, 1728–29 (2012).
76 See Jurow, supra note 74.
77 BAKER, supra note 63, at 46.  As an example of this form of constitutional reasoning,
see The Act for the Abolition of the Court of Star Chamber 1641, 17 Car. I c. 10, § 1
(Eng.), reprinted in SAMUEL RAWSON GARDINER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE
PURITAN REVOLUTION 1625–1660, at 179 (3d ed. 1906), which is a long litany of the acts of
Parliament, beginning with “the Great Charter,” expounding the rights of life, liberty, and
property according to the law of the land and due process of law. See id.
78 See HALE’S PREROGATIVES, supra note 52, at 191 (defining “process of law” as the
“legal coercion” which “precedes judgment” and contrasting it with “execution,” the coer-
cion which follows judgment).
79 Id. at 181–84.
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the paradigmatic example of a deprivation of rights that was subject to the
requirement.  The government could punish someone only for a violation of
a standing law (the rule of law requirement), and only after procedures
applicable to the alleged crime (i.e., an indictment or presentment, jury trial,
and so forth).
Though the rule of law and procedural understandings of the due pro-
cess requirement usually overlap, they have given rise to different conceptual
disputes through the centuries.  In early modern England, for instance, the
question was whether a certain law applicable to a case was part of the “law of
the land” such that it might authorize a detention consistent with Chapter
29.80  Once it is established that a deprivation is subject to the law of the land
requirement, however, an entirely different question arises: What, exactly, is
the judicial process required by Chapter 29 (and related provisions)?  In the
American context, yet another question arises: May the legislature abrogate
traditional procedural requirements, as Parliament undoubtedly may?81
Courts continue to struggle with these questions, especially in the context of
war.  As we shall see, English and American jurists often spoke of deprivations
of rights during war being subject to the law of the land, even when they were
not subject to judicial procedures.
B. Rereading Blackstone on the Law of the Land
The jurist who probably most influenced the American Framers’ under-
standing of due process was Sir William Blackstone, so his views are worth
exploring in some depth.  Blackstone made the law of the land and its pro-
tection of life, liberty, and property central to the constitutional reflections
that open his four-volume commentary on the common law.82
For Blackstone, life is a natural right that may be taken only according to
law.  For this he cites Chapter 29 and two of the due process statutes of
Edward III.83  This combines the rule of law and judicial procedure require-
ments of due process.
“[P]ersonal liberty consists in the power of loco-motion, of changing sit-
uation, or moving one’s person to whatsoever place one’s inclination may
80 See HALLIDAY, supra note 54, at 137–47 (discussing, among other things, the argu-
ments of John Selden and others in “the Five Knights’ case”).
81 See, e.g., Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272, 276 (1856); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
82 See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at *122–45.  In particular, see id. at *133–34 for a
discussion of life, id. at *134 for a discussion of liberty, and id. at *138 for a discussion of
property.  Blackstone also cites an array of other statutes that likewise protect life, liberty,
and property. See id. at *133–34 (citing 5 Edw. 3 c. 9 (1331) (Eng.)); id. at *135 (citing 3
Car. 1 (1627) (Eng.)); id. at *142 (first citing 2 Edw. 3 c. 8 (1328) (Eng.); then citing 11
Ric. 2 c. 10 (1387) (Eng.); then citing Statute the Second, 18 Edw. 3 c. 4 (1344) (Eng.);
then citing The Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M. 2 c. 2 (1689) (Eng.); and then citing 16 Car. 1 c.
10 (1640) (Eng.)).
83 Id. at *133.
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direct, without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law.”84
Liberty is a natural right that may be taken only “with[ ] the explicit permis-
sion of the laws.”85  He again cites Chapter 29 and notes that “many subse-
quent old statutes expressly direct, that no man shall be taken or imprisoned
by suggestion or petition to the king or his council, unless it be by legal
indictment, or the process of the common law.”86  Here we see both the rule
of law and judicial process components of the law of the land requirement.
Among the laws Blackstone lists as enforcing the law of the land require-
ment are the “petition of right” and “the habeas corpus Act,”87 both of which
require judicial review of the lawfulness of detentions.88  Only Parliament
could suspend the Habeas Corpus Act, and only “for a short and limited
time.”89
To make imprisonment lawful, it must either be by process from the courts
of judicature, or by warrant from some legal officer having authority to com-
mit to prison; which warrant must be in writing, under the hand and seal of
the magistrate, and express the causes of the commitment, in order to be
examined into, if necessary, upon a habeas corpus.90
To comply with the law of the land requirements, therefore, deprivations of
liberty had to be authorized in advance by a court according to traditional
procedures, or subject to post-hoc habeas review.  Both types of judicial pro-
cedures were mechanisms of enforcing the Chapter 29 law of the land
requirement.
Property was somewhat different.  While “[t]he original of private prop-
erty is probably founded in nature,” “certainly the modifications under which
we at present find it, the method of conserving it in the present owner, and
of translating it from man to man, are entirely derived from society.”91  Once
again, Blackstone cites Chapter 29 and related statutes for the proposition
that the government may not deprive a person of property rights “against the
great charter, and the law of the land.”92  Blackstone does not list specific
judicial procedures for protecting property rights other than to explain the
ways that limitations on the powers of eminent domain and taxation ensure
that they are exercised consistent with the rule of law.93
Throughout his discussion of the ways that English law protects the
rights to life, liberty, and property, Blackstone alludes to both the rule of law
and the judicial procedure conceptions of the Chapter 29 law of the land
84 Id. at *134.
85 Id.
86 Id. at *135 (internal citation omitted).
87 Id.
88 Id. at *135 (first citing Habeas Corpus Act 1640, 16 Car. 1 c. 10 (Eng.); and then
citing Habeas Corpus Act 1679, 31 Car. 2 c. 2 (Eng.)).
89 Id. at *136.
90 Id. at *137.
91 Id. at *138.
92 Id. at *138–39.
93 Id. at *139–40.
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requirement.  With respect to the rule of law, what did Blackstone mean by
the “law of the land”?  Elsewhere in the Commentaries he suggests that the law
of the land was synonymous with the laws of England, the laws that England
had adopted as its own.  Two sorts of laws were in force in England yet were
not part of the law of the land.  The first were laws that did not govern the
whole of England: the special customs, usages, and laws of communities such
as London.94  The second were laws that originated outside of England but
had not been “introduced and allowed” by English law.95  The civil and
canon law systems were the principal examples.96  Those ancient systems had
purchase in England only to the extent England had received them.97  “[I]n
all points in which the different systems [the law of England and the civil law]
depart from each other, the law of the land takes place of the law of Rome,
whether ancient or modern, imperial or pontifical.”98  As we shall see,
England had adopted many aspects of the law of nations into its own munici-
pal law, thus making it part of the law of the land.  In particular, much of the
law of war was part of the law of the land.
As for judicial procedures, which are required by the Chapter 29?  The
answer depends on the type of deprivation.  Deprivation of life, liberty, or
property as a punishment for the violation of a crime must follow the appro-
priate forms of indictment or presentment and jury trial.  All deprivations of
liberty must follow judicial process or be upon written warrant subject to
habeas review.
To these Blackstone adds the right “of applying to the courts of justice
for redress of injuries.”99  For this proposition, he leans principally on the
nulli vendemus provision of Chapter 29 and is less straightforward that it is a
necessary implication of the law of the land provision of that same Chapter.
Yet it is clear from his discussion that the right of judicial redress of injuries
against governmental officers arises from the same statutory prohibitions
against deprivations contrary to the law of the land that he has been citing
from the beginning of his discussion.100  As we shall see, courts used many of
the traditional judicial processes to ensure that deprivations of life, liberty,
and property were according to the law of the land—even during war, and
even, in some cases, for enemies.
94 Id. at *75, *83; see HALLIDAY, supra note 54, at 189–92.
95 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at *14.
96 Id. (noting that foreign laws “have in some particular cases, and in some particular
courts, been introduced and allowed by our laws”); see also MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY
OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND, AND AN ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL PART OF THE LAW 45–46
(Charles Runnington ed., 6th ed. 1820).
97 See HALLIDAY, supra note 54, at 145–46 (mentioning a 1616 lecture by Francis Ashley
that the law of the land included “all forms and processes ‘warranted by custom’”).
98 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at *15.
99 Id. at *141.
100 Id. at *141–42 (first citing 2 Edw. 3 c. 8 (1328) (Eng.); then citing 11 Ric. 2 c. 10
(1387) (Eng.); and then citing The Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M. 2, c. 2 (1689) (Eng.)).
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III. THE ENGLISH BACKGROUND
Americans inherited not only the English notion of due process but also
the English understanding of law during war.  This Part therefore explains
the English background to the American framework of due process during
war.
By the late eighteenth century, English jurists maintained that the law of
nations, including the law of war, was part of the law of the land because
England had adopted it as its own law.  The law of nations at once bound
England against other nations and also shaped the rights of individuals
under English municipal (or domestic) law.  A state of war changed many of
the rights of subjects, enemies, and neutrals, both under the law of nations
and under municipal law.  Yet deprivations of rights during war were still
subject to the law of the land.
Many but not all of those deprivations were also subject to judicial proce-
dural requirements.  Courts entertained habeas petitions by enemies and
prisoners of war held within the Crown’s domains.  Admiralty courts applied
a combination of the law of nations and municipal law to adjudicate prize
suits.  Crown courts supervised the application of military law by courts mar-
tial and awarded damages against military officers who exceeded their lawful
authority under a variety of circumstances.  Wartime deprivations that were
beyond judicial oversight included deprivations on the battlefield and
according to lawful suspensions of habeas corpus or declarations of martial
law.  Americans largely adopted this framework, adapting it to their govern-
ment’s constitutional separation of powers and judicial structure.
A. The Law of War as the Law of the Land
1. The Law of Nations
In the late eighteenth century, the law of nations consisted of an intri-
cate network of natural law, treaties, and customs that governed the relation-
ships among nations and between nations and individuals.  There were a
number of influential learned treatises on the law of nations,101 but Ameri-
cans relied heavily on the work of Emmerich de Vattel.102
101 See, e.g., 2 ALBERICO GENTILI, DE IURE BELLI LIBRI TRES (John C. Rolfe trans.,
London, Humphrey Milford 1933) (1612); 2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI
TRES (Francis W. Kelsey trans., London, Humphrey Milford 1925) (1625); THOMAS HOB-
BES, LEVIATHAN (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1651); SAMUEL
PUFENDORF, De Jure Naturae et Gentium (On the Law of Nature and of Nations), in THE POLITI-
CAL WRITINGS OF SAMUEL PUFENDORF 95 (Craig L. Carr ed., Michael J. Seidler trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1994) (1744); FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, On the American Indians (De Indis),
in POLITICAL WRITINGS 231 (Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrance eds., 1991); FRANCISCO
DE VITORIA, On the Law of War, in POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra, at 293.
102 VATTEL, supra note 25; see WITT, supra note 31, at 16 (upon publication, Vattel’s
treatise “quickly became the most widely read authority in Europe and its colonies on ques-
tions relating to a body of rules known as the law of nations”); see  also PETER ONUF &
NICHOLAS ONUF, FEDERAL UNION, MODERN WORLD: THE LAW OF NATIONS IN AN AGE OF
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The law of nations was Janus-faced.  While it governed a nation’s exter-
nal relations with others,103 it also affected the nation’s internal, or “munici-
pal,” law.  By the late eighteenth century, the foundational principle of the
law of nations was that sovereign nations are moral persons in a state of
nature vis-a`-vis one another.104  Externally, nations were equal and complete
in themselves; there was no independent human institution that could settle
their disputes.105  In this respect, the law of nations was not “law” in the sense
of settled rules of decision applied by courts.106  Nations settled disputes
between themselves with diplomacy, economic sanctions, and force.
But the law of nations had another, inward-looking, face.  Nations imple-
mented some of their rights and duties with respect to other nations through
their own law,107 what jurists described as “municipal” law.108  Such laws were
binding on individuals and enforceable however the nation decided to
enforce them, often through its courts.109
The law of retaliation illustrates this distinction.110  One way an
aggrieved nation could enforce its rights against another was to authorize
one of its subjects to capture the goods of the other nation’s subjects.111  As
Vattel put it, “[i]t is only between state and state that all the property of the
individuals is considered as belonging to the nation.”112  Taking the for-
eigner’s private property, therefore, as recompense for some wrongdoing by
his sovereign, is justified.
REVOLUTIONS 1776–1814, at 11 (1993) (“Translated immediately into English, [Vattel] was
unrivaled among such treatises in its influence on the American founders.”); Douglas J.
Sylvester, International Law as Sword or Shield? Early American Foreign Policy and the Law of
Nations, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 67 (1999) (explaining that in American judicial
decisions, “in all, in the 1780s and 1790s, there were nine citations to Pufendorf, sixteen to
Grotius, twenty-five to Bynkershoek, and a staggering ninety-two to Vattel”).
103 Vattel used “nation” and “sovereign state” interchangeably to refer to a “societ[y] of
men united together for the purpose of promoting their mutual safety and advantage by
the joint efforts of their combined strength.” VATTEL, supra note 25, preliminaries, § 1, at
67.
104 See RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 9 (1999); VATTEL, supra note 25,
preliminaries, § 6, at 68–69; see also 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at *43.
105 VATTEL, supra note 25, preliminaries, §§ 18–20, at 75.
106 This is the “voluntary” law of nations discussed infra in notes 126, 313.
107 See infra Part III (discussing the reception of the law of nations into the English law
of the land).
108 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at *44 (“[M]unicipal [law is] the rule by which partic-
ular districts, communities, or nations, are governed . . . .”).
109 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at *66–73 (discussing offenses against the law of
nations); 2 RICHARD WOODDESON, Lecture XXXIV, in A SYSTEMATICAL VIEW OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND *421, *421 (Dublin, E. Lynch et al. 1792) (1777) (discussing the rules governing
captures at sea).
110 VATTEL, supra note 25, bk. II, § 339, at 458–59.
111 Id. bk. II, § 342, at 460, § 344, at 461 (noting that “the wealth of the citizens” is an
appropriate object of reprisal).
112 Id. bk. II, § 346, at 462.
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From an internal perspective, however, the law of nations, under its own
terms, required both the reprising nation and the original wrongdoer to
implement their rights and responsibilities through municipal law.  To pre-
vent disputes from spiraling out of control, only a sovereign could authorize
a reprisal against another.113  Private parties could not take matters into their
own hands.  Which institution had the authority to order, implement, and
adjudicate a retaliation on behalf of a sovereign, and the procedures the sov-
ereign was obligated to follow, were a matter of municipal law that differed
according to a nation’s constitution.114  Municipal law therefore specified
which municipal institution had authority to authorize a capture, which one
had authority to condemn it, who was entitled to the proceeds, how they
were to be divided, etc.115  Such rules combined the law of nations, constitu-
tional law, maritime law, and, in some cases, criminal law (for example, an
unauthorized capture could be prosecuted as piracy).116  A nation could
choose to indemnify its subject whose property was the object of a reprisal,
likewise according to municipal law.117
By the late eighteenth century, English and American common law
jurists agreed that the bulk of the customary law of nations formed part of
the common law, subject to change by legislation or treaty.
Blackstone explained that the law of nations “is held to be a part of the
law of the land” because it was “adopted in its full extent by the common
law.”118  In a sense, the law of nations was even more fundamental than the
law of England:
[T]hose acts of parliament which have from time to time been made to
enforce this universal law, or to facilitate the execution of its decisions, are
not to be considered as introductive of any new rule, but merely as declara-
113 Id.
114 WHEATON, supra note 62, at 40 (citing VATTEL, supra note 25, bk. III, § 4, at 470).
115 See, e.g., R.G. Marsden, Introduction to 2 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE LAW AND CUS-
TOM OF THE SEA, at xii (R.G. Marsden ed., 1916); see also WHEATON, supra note 62, at 42
(discussing U.S. law).
116 2 WOODDESON, supra note 109, at *421 (discussing the law of captures at sea).
117 VATTEL, supra note 25, bk. II, § 345, at 461.
118 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at *67; see also Triquet v. Bath (1764) 97 Eng. Rep.
936, 938; 3 Burr. 1478, 1482 (quoting Barbuit’s Case (1736) 25 Eng. Rep. 777, 778 n.1; 4
Burr. 2016) (“That the law of nations, in its full extent was part of the law of England.”); 2
WOODDESON, supra note 109, at *421 (“[T]he law of nations is part of the laws of
England.”).  While Blackstone’s assertion that England had “adopted” the law of nations
“in its full extent” seems absolute enough, elsewhere he displays a nuanced view of how the
law of nations entered the law of the land, with the implication that not all of the law of
nations had always been part of the law of the land—only the part that England had
adopted. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at *256–57 (asserting that the doctrine of diplo-
matic immunity, first guaranteed in England by statute, was “now held to be part of the law
of the land, and constantly allowed in the courts of [the] common law”); 4 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 53, at *273 (explaining how the law merchant entered the law of the land
through the common law).
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tory of the old fundamental constitutions of the kingdom: without which it
must cease to be a part of the civilized world.119
Blackstone suggested that the law of nations should be seen as prior to
the law of England in two ways.  First, chronologically: by enacting laws enforc-
ing the law of nations, Parliament merely “declar[ed] . . . the old fundamen-
tal constitutions of the kingdom.”120  Second, and perhaps more
importantly, the law of nations was also prior to the law of England logically.
This is why Blackstone asserted the myth that the law of nations was chrono-
logically prior to the law of England—without the law of nations being part
of the law of the land, the nation itself would “cease to be a part of the civi-
lized world.”121
How did the law of nations enter the law of the land?  It depended on
the law and the time.  Treaties, of course, were part of the law of the land.
Some rules, such as the principle of diplomatic immunity, entered English
law through statute.122  The law merchant, by contrast, entered at first by
judicial ratification of custom.123  By the early nineteenth century, however,
jurists like Edward Christian, one of Blackstone’s early editors, believed that
the raw assertion that the law merchant was part of “the general law of the
land” “has frequently led merchants to suppose, that all their new fashions
and devices immediately become the law of the land: a notion which, per-
haps, has been too much encouraged by the courts.”124  Accordingly, consis-
tent with the positivism of the day, he suggested that any changes to the law
should be by statute.125
Despite Blackstone’s assertion that the law of nations was part of the law
of England, scholars dispute the extent to which this was so.126  These dis-
119 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at *67.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Diplomatic Privileges Act 1708, 7 Ann. c. 12 (Gr. Brit.); 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note
53, at *256; see, e.g., E.R. Adair, The Law of Nations and the Common Law of England: A Study of
7 Anne Cap. 12, 2 CAMBRIDGE HIST. J. 290, 294–95 (1928).
123 See ANTHONY J. BELLIA JR. & BRADFORD R. CLARK, THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 7 (2017) (citing 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at *273);
Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 20–21 (2009).
124 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 75 n.8 (Edward Christian ed., 17th ed.
London, Richard Taylor 1830).
125 See id.
126 See, e.g., BELLIA & CLARK, supra note 123, at 7 (citing 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at
*273) (discussing Blackstone’s argument that the lex mercatoria originally entered the law of
the land through the courts).  American scholars dispute the degree to which, and the way
in which, American law adopted the law of nations. See, e.g., Bellia & Clark, supra note 123,
at 14, 20–22 (arguing that Blackstone believed customary international law was subject to
statute); William S. Dodge, Customary International Law, Change, and the Constitution, 106
GEO. L.J. 1559, 1568 (2018) (“In describing the law of nations, however, Blackstone marks
no difference in the obligatory force of the rules in each branch.”); id. at 1569 (arguing
that Americans followed Vattel’s distinction between the voluntary law of nations (which
was obligatory) and the customary law of nations (which was not)).
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putes are largely about the extent to which a nation was understood, or
ought to be understood, to enjoy the sovereignty to determine its own law.127
At a minimum, it seems clear that the law of nations was part of the law of the
land to the extent England had affirmatively adopted it as such by treaty,
statute, or judicial decision.  This was the case for many principles and rules
of the law of war.
2. The Law of War
To mitigate the suffering of warfare, western jurists and statesmen devel-
oped a subset of the law of nations known as the law of war.  This body of law
consisted of principles that we would now call “just war theory”128 and articu-
lated those principles with specific rules.129  As with the law of nations more
generally, jurists and statesmen disputed the terms of those rules depending
on their nation’s geopolitical strengths and weaknesses.130
One principle was clear and uniformly observed: under the law of
nations, war flipped a switch.  A belligerent nation’s rights and duties
changed with respect to other nations, whether enemies or neutrals.  Con-
duct that would have been unlawful during a time of peace was not only
allowed but sometimes mandatory during war.131  For instance, during
peace, a nation had a right to trade with other nations.  A U.S. public warship
that prevented a French merchant from entering a Spanish port would make
the United States liable both to Spain and to France.  During a publicly
declared war between the United States and Spain, however, France and its
merchants, though neutral, would be obligated to respect a U.S. blockade of
a Spanish port.132
War not only changed the rights of nations, it also changed the rights
and duties of a belligerent nation with respect to the subjects of enemy and
neutral nations.  The subjects of an enemy nation became enemy aliens.  The
law of nations permitted a nation to deprive enemy aliens of rights without
127 See, e.g., Amanda Perreau-Saussine, A Case Study on Jurisprudence as a Source of Interna-
tional Law: Oppenheim’s Influence, in TIME, HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 91 (Matthew
Craven et al. eds., 2007) (focusing on the extent to which customary international law is
inherently a part of British law).
128 See generally 2 GENTILI, supra note 101; 2 GROTIUS, supra note 101; MICHAEL WALZER,
JUST AND UNJUST WARS (5th ed. 2015).
129 See generally 2 GROTIUS, supra note 101; 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN
LAW 45–148 (New York, O. Halsted 1826) (lectures III–VIII; on law of nations in wartime);
VATTEL, supra note 25, bk. III, §§ 1–296, at 469–649 (covering “Book III: Of War”); WHEA-
TON, supra note 62.
130 For instance, at the turn of the nineteenth century, one of the key disagreements
was whether a belligerent could capture and condemn enemy cargo shipped in a neutral
vessel. See WHEATON, supra note 62, app. at 317–19.
131 See WITT, supra note 31, at 24–26 (discussing General Washington’s insistence that
the law of war required hanging British Major John Andre´ for espionage over Alexander
Hamilton’s calls for clemency).
132 See, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
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the ordinary legal protections and judicial procedures.133  To a lesser extent,
the law of war also authorized a belligerent nation to deprive neutral subjects
of property without ordinary legal procedures.134  In the example above, the
French vessel and cargo, though the property of a neutral subject, would be
liable to capture by a U.S. public warship and to condemnation by a U.S.
federal court.  Such a deprivation of property was perfectly consistent with
the law of war, though it would violate the law of nations outside of war.
The law of war did not eliminate the rights of enemies and neutrals—it
changed them, or made them subject to change, according to municipal
law.135  A belligerent state had the right to take the life of an enemy soldier
on a battlefield.136  When the enemy had surrendered, however, the belliger-
ent state had no right to take the soldier’s life or property.137  The state
could then deprive the soldier of liberty by making him a prisoner of war.138
The rights of enemy soldiers and sailors were of course the most affected by
the law of war.  Enemy residents and neutrals enjoyed more robust rights,
though war reduced those too.139  For instance, Vattel maintained that a bel-
ligerent nation had a right to deprive an enemy of all property necessary for
“the means of resistance.”140
Like the law of nations, the law of war was dual faced, with external and
internal applications.  Externally, unlawful deprivations of the rights of
enemy or neutral soldiers and sailors were violations of the rights of those
soldiers’ and sailors’ sovereign.  The aggrieved sovereign thus had a right to
respond in kind with reprisals against the offending sovereign’s soldiers and
sailors.141  A violation of the law of war could prompt a vicious cycle of repri-
sals that would increase, rather than mitigate, the suffering of war.142  Given
the stakes, the law of war carefully spelled out the what, when, who, where,
and how of killings, detentions, and property takings during war because the
specifics determined whether a deprivation authorized retaliation.143  Inter-
133 VATTEL, supra note 25, bk. III, §§ 136–73, at 541–75.
134 Id. bk. III, §§ 111–17, at 528–33.
135 Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 125 (1814) (“It may be considered
as the opinion of all who have written on the jus belli, that war gives the right to confiscate,
but does not itself confiscate the property of the enemy . . . .”).
136 VATTEL, supra note 25, bk. III, § 139, at 543; see id. bk. III, § 155, at 557–62 (explain-
ing enemy may not be lawfully assassinated or poisoned, but assassination is distinguished
from “surprises”).
137 Id. bk. III, § 140, at 543–44, § 149, at 552 (stating prisoners of war are generally not
to be put to death).
138 Id. bk. III, § 148, at 551–52.
139 See id. bk. III, § 147, at 550–51 (“At present war is carried on by regular troops: the
people, the peasants, the citizens, take no part in it, and generally have nothing to fear
from the sword of the enemy.”).
140 Id. bk. III, § 160, at 566–67.
141 Id. bk. III, § 142, at 545–46.
142 See, e.g., WITT, supra note 31, at 13–48, 141–69.
143 Id. at 18 (“Vattel hoped to bring an end to the otherwise endless and destructive
contests over which of the belligerents—if any—fought on the side of the angels. . . .
Instead, Vattel’s approach generated a dizzying array of rules.”); see also VATTEL, supra note
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nally, each nation implemented its authority under the law of nations to
deprive enemies and neutrals of their individual rights according to its own
municipal law.  In many cases, courts reviewed deprivations of rights for com-
pliance with the law of nations as implemented by municipal law.  In this way,
the law of war was part of the law of the land.144
The most common implementation of this conceptual framework in the
late eighteenth century was the law and practice of prize courts.145  Under
the law of war, a belligerent state could capture an enemy (and in some cases
a neutral) vessel on the high seas and confiscate the vessel and cargo.146  The
law of war also stipulated that captures had to be authorized by the belliger-
ent state and confiscation had to follow condemnation proceedings accord-
ing to the rules of admiralty before an authorized prize court.147  The law of
war did not, however, determine which of the belligerent state’s governmen-
tal institutions had the authority to authorize a capture,148 nor did it deter-
mine which of the sovereign’s subjects had such authority.149  Those were
questions of municipal law that implicated the belligerent sovereign’s rights
of war.150  Likewise, the law of war did not determine which municipal court
had jurisdiction to condemn prizes,151 the specific procedures that that court
would use, or the method of appeal.152  Those were likewise questions of
municipal law.
It was commonplace that prize courts decided cases according to the law
of nations.  They applied (and developed) a variety of rules articulated by
25, bk. III, §§ 136–173, at 541–75 (discussing the various rules for treatment of the enemy
in wartime).
144 See WHEATON, supra note 62, at 209 (“In a state of war between two nations, declared
by the authority in whom the municipal constitution vests the power of making war, the
two nations, and all their citizens or subjects, are enemies of each other.  The consequence
of this state of hostility is, that all intercourse and communication between them is unlaw-
ful.  This principle of public law forms a part of the municipal jurisprudence of every
country.”).
145 Probably the most influential statement of the law of prize for American jurists was a
memorandum drafted on January 18, 1753 by four of the leading English jurists of the day,
including Dudley Ryder and William Murray (who later became Lord Mansfield). See id. at
app. 317–340.
146 WHEATON, supra note 62, at 41.
147 Id. app. at 319.
148 See WHEATON, supra note 62, at 40 (“[A]s the different rights which constitute this
power, originally resident in the body of the nation, may be separated or limited according
to the national will, it is in the municipal constitution of each particular state that we are to
seek the power of making war.”).
149 See id. at 41.
150 Id. at 280 (“Independent of such a municipal prohibition, there is nothing to limit
the right of capture, or the jurisdiction of courts of prize, to property found on the high
seas or water borne.”).
151 Id. at 273; id. app. at 319 (referencing the Ryder and Murray Memorandum).
152 Id. at 320 (“[T]here is in every maritime country a superior court of review, consist-
ing of the most considerable persons, to which the parties, who think themselves
aggrieved, may appeal . . . .”).
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treaty, treatise writers, and foreign prize courts.  It was in this sense that the
American international law scholar and jurist Henry Wheaton could write
that “the prize court is a court of the law of nations” that “belongs to other
nations as well as to its own,” and “foreigners have a right to demand from it
. . . the administration of the law of nations, simply, and exclusively of the
introduction of principles borrowed from the municipal jurisprudence.”153
But a prize court could not determine the lawfulness of a capture, or adjudi-
cate a prize, without likewise ensuring that the entire proceedings, from com-
mission to capture to condemnation to appeal, accorded with the municipal
law that implemented the nation’s right to take prizes.154  The two inquiries
were interwoven.
English jurists recognized that the law governing prize cases was “part of
the laws of England.”155  As discussed above, Blackstone maintained that the
law of nations, insofar as English courts were bound to apply it, was part of
the “law of the land.”156  Blackstone’s successor at Oxford, Richard Wood-
deson, gave more attention to the relationship of English law and the law of
nations.  In a 1777 Vinerian Lecture on the law “of captures at sea,” Wood-
deson began by noting that “[t]he law of nations is adopted and appealed to
by civilized states, as the criterion for adjusting all controversies proper to be
so decided.”157
In such case[s] neither the customs of the British admiralty, nor British acts
of parliament, can, as such, be of sufficient authority and avail.  But the law
of nations is part of the laws of England.  And the following observations will
be built, not only on the credit of civilians and writers on general jurispru-
dence, but also on books familiar to the English lawyer, and the decisions of
municipal courts of justice.158
The reader familiar with Blackstone understands that the reason the law
of nations was part of the laws of England is because, and insofar as, England
had “adopted” it.  As Wooddeson stated elsewhere:
[T]he Law of Nations is [a] constituent part of British jurisprudence, and
has always been most liberally adopted and attended to by our municipal
tribunals, in matters where that rule of decision was proper to be resorted to,
as questions respecting the privileges of [a]mbassadors, and the property in
maritime captures and prizes.159
153 Id. at 226.
154 2 WOODDESON, supra note 109, at *421; see Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1,
24 (1801), superseded by Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct.
1865 (2018); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 43 (1800).
155 Bas, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 43.
156 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at *67.
157 2 WOODDESON, supra note 109, at *421.
158 Id. (emphasis added).
159 RICHARD WOODDESON, ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE TREATED OF IN THE PRELIMINARY
PART OF A COURSE OF LECTURES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 158 (Dublin, H. Fitzpatrick
1792) (1783).
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There were practical reasons the law of prize had to be part of municipal
law.  The line between piracy and the capture of a prize was crucial; the same
conduct that amounted to a crime was an act of war when sponsored by a
sovereign.  But the principles under the law of nations that governed the
distinction between piracy and prize were vague.  Each sovereign therefore
defined piracy, and thereby circumscribed the terms of lawful prize through
its own municipal law.  For instance, Vattel held that a subject of a belligerent
sovereign who captured an enemy merchant vessel without authorization
should be punished as a pirate.160  Wooddeson noted that English law and
practice were different.161  “[I]n our municipal law books it is generally and
indiscriminately asserted, that piracy cannot be committed by the subjects of
states at enmity.”162  Therefore “the law of nations is in this country under-
stood to tolerate at least the seizure and capture of enemy’s ships and goods
in time of open hostilities, without the sanction of a special commission.”163
England neither punished noncommissioned privateers nor encouraged
them; a noncommissioned privateer would not share in the proceeds of the
sale of the condemned vessel and goods.164  Municipal law defined the edges
of the law of nations, and sometimes departed strategically from it.
Writing after the War of 1812, Henry Wheaton came to much the same
conclusion as Wooddeson, that the law of war was inextricably related to
municipal law for purposes of authorizing the deprivation of enemy rights.
After stating that only the sovereign power of a state has “authority to make
war,”165 Wheaton cited Vattel for the proposition that “as the different rights
which constitute this power, originally resident in the body of the nation, may
be separated or limited according to the national will, it is in the municipal
constitution of each particular state that we are to seek the power of making
war.”166  “Thus,” he concluded, “in the United States the Congress are
invested with this power.”167
Wheaton emphasized that “[t]he conduct of public vessels of war, or of
private armed vessels commissioned as letters of marque, is regulated by
instructions from the sovereign, or supreme executive power of the state.”168
He explained that though the law of war gives belligerent sovereigns the
right to capture enemy property, that right is “entirely derived from the law:
It is not an absolute vested right which cannot be taken away or modified by
law: It is a limited right, which is subject to all the restraints that the legisla-
ture imposes, and is to be exercised in the manner its wisdom prescribes.”169
160 2 WOODDESON, supra note 109, at *433; see VATTEL, supra note 25, bk. III, § 174, at
575–76, § 223, at 612, § 226, at 612–13.
161 See 2 WOODDESON, supra note 109, at *432.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 See id. at 433.
165 WHEATON, supra note 62, at 40.
166 Id. (citing VATTEL, supra note 25, bk. III, § 4, at 470).
167 Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10).
168 Id. at 47–48; see id. at 41.
169 Id. at 49.
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Wheaton noted that privateers who overstep their lawful bounds should
be held liable and, after surveying the various ways that France, England, and
the United States had limited the liability of privateers, maintained that such
limits “must depend upon the positive provisions of municipal law.”170
Throughout his treatise, Wheaton referred to the cases in which the U.S.
Supreme Court decided the lawfulness of U.S. captures and condemnations
of prize by reference not only to the law of nations but also to U.S. municipal
law.171
In short, Wooddeson and Wheaton, writing on either side of the Ameri-
can War of Independence and the War of 1812, both articulate the internal-
facing aspect of the law of war.  Both explain that belligerent rights were part
of, and subject to, municipal law.  The law of war, insofar as it was incorpo-
rated into municipal law, was part of the law of the land.
B. The Two Faces of “Martial Law”
Another part of English law that bore on the scope of individual rights
during war was martial law.  Though Matthew Hale and William Blackstone
derided martial law as antithetical to the rule of law, by the late eighteenth
century a number of jurists had responded to these criticisms with forceful
accounts of martial law as part of the law of the land.
The common lawyers’ criticism of martial law appears to stem from a
misunderstanding of the fundamental difference between the two bodies of
law that traveled under the term “martial law.”  Both originated in the medie-
val court martial,172 but by the late eighteenth century they were on different
constitutional footing.  The first was the government of a military dictator
over civilians during crisis.  The second was the law governing members of
the navy and army.  By the late eighteenth century, both were in fact subject
to the law of the land, though in different ways.
Blackstone, citing Hale, referred to martial law as “in truth and reality no
law, but something indulged rather than allowed as a law.”173  Blackstone
admitted that military law was authorized by statute, but he emphasized that
the annually passed Mutiny Act gave the Crown wide latitude to specify mili-
tary offenses and punishments for the army, which he called “an unlimited
power to create crimes, and annex to them any punishments, not extending
to life or limb!”174
170 Id. at 44.
171 See id. at 23–29 (discussing Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 125
(1814)); id. at 48 (discussing The Mary, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 388 (1814), and The Frances,
12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 358 (1814)); id. at 50 (discussing The Thomas Gibbons, 12 U.S. (8
Cranch) 421 (1814)).
172 For an account of the evolution of martial law through the seventeenth century, see
JOHN M. COLLINS, MARTIAL LAW AND ENGLISH LAWS, c.1500–c.1700 (2016).
173 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at *413 (paraphrasing HALE’S PREROGATIVES, supra
note 52, at 42); see also S. PAYNE ADYE, A TREATISE ON COURTS MARTIAL 50 (8th ed. London,
Vernor et al. 1810); 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53 at *437.
174 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at *415.
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Subsequent English and American commentators took issue with this
characterization of military law, emphasizing that the law governing the mili-
tary was based on statute.175  The Scottish jurist Alexander Tytler bemoaned
Blackstone’s ill-informed account of modern military law, taking it upon him-
self “to correct this palpable misrepresentation, and to exhibit the Military
Law as it truly is, a part of the laws of the land, enacted by the same authority,
enforced by the same power, and resting on the same foundation of justice,
good policy, and humanity.”176  By a series of enactments, Parliament had
provided “express rules, articles, and orders” that specified “almost every pos-
sible offence . . . and the punishment annexed.”177  Moreover, the annual
Mutiny Act, which authorized the Crown to publish articles of war for the
regulation of the army, spelled out those offenses punishable by death.178
Some institutional aspects of military justice, such as the use of a court of
inquiry for bringing charges, were the product of “precedents and customs
long established.”179
Importantly, the common-law courts ensured that courts martial acted
within the discretion afforded them by law.  Isaac Maltby, an American writ-
ing in 1813, summarized the relationship between the common-law courts
and courts martial like this: “The military is subject to the civil power; and all
those who act in a military capacity, are individually responsible before the
civil courts, for any illegal act.”180  As individuals, “members of [a] court mar-
tial are responsible, in an action of damages” and as a court “their proceed-
ings are cognizable by a civil court . . . [b]y proceedings in the nature of a
review[,] and by an application for a prohibition.”181  An action for damages
lay against a member of a court martial for illegal punishment or illegal pro-
ceedings of the court.182  It is unsurprising, therefore, that Maltby would
begin the first chapter of his treatise by describing a court martial as “a legally
organized body, to investigate, deliberate, decide, adjudge, and award sen-
tence, concerning offences committed against military law” that “is regulated
175 See ADYE, supra note 173, at 12–13; ISAAC MALTBY, A TREATISE ON COURTS MARTIAL
AND MILITARY LAW (Boston, Thomas B. Wait & Co. 1813); JOHN M’ARTHUR, A TREATISE OF
THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF NAVAL COURTS-MARTIAL 21–22 (London, Whieldon & But-
terworth 1792); ALEXANDER FRASER TYTLER, AN ESSAY ON MILITARY LAW, AND THE PRACTICE
OF COURTS MARTIAL, at vi–vii (2d ed. London, T. Egerton 1806). See generally RICHARD
JOSEPH SULIVAN, THOUGHTS ON MARTIAL LAW (2d ed. London, T. Becket 1784) (on the
mechanics of a court martial).
176 TYTLER, supra note 175, at vii.  Blackstone’s earliest editors made the same point.
See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at *413 n.5.
177 M’ARTHUR, supra note 175, at 21.
178 Id. at 21–22.
179 Id. at 44.
180 MALTBY, supra note 175, at 149.
181 Id. at 150.
182 Id.; see id. at 151 (“Many instances of such prosecutions are referred to, by writers on
military law.”); M’ARTHUR, supra note 175, at 22.
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and governed in its proceedings and deliberations, in its judgment and sen-
tence, ‘by the laws of the land.’”183
Charles I had claimed the power to impose martial law upon ordinary
subjects during time of peace, which Parliament declared to be unlawful in
the Petition of Right.184  Upon the Glorious Revolution, the Declaration of
Rights forbade the Crown from suspending laws and from suspending habeas
corpus without Parliament’s approval.185  Commentators recognized that
these powers, authorized solely by Parliament, were tied to the power to insti-
tute “Martial law, and the mode of summary trial by Courts-Martial” “in times
of actual rebellion” “for a limited time, either over a part or the whole of the
kingdom where such rebellion may exist.”186  The military could regulate,
prosecute, and punish civilians only pursuant to legislative authority.  Tytler
notes that in 1798 Parliament authorized punishment of Irish rebels by mar-
tial law and courts martial notwithstanding that the common-law courts (or at
least some of them) were still open.187  Martial law was indeed a departure
from the ordinary law of the land, but it was, somewhat ironically, permissible
only by law.188
Military law was part of the law of the land.  Courts martial proceeded
according to established judicial procedures and were subject to review by
the courts at Westminster.  In the parlance of this Article, deprivations of
rights by courts martial were subject to the rule of law and to the judicial
procedure requirements of due process.189  Martial law, by contrast, was an
alternative to the law of the land.  Though martial law was lawful only when
authorized by the legislature, it subjected civilians and members of the
armed forces to governance without recourse to the common-law courts.
Insofar as it was authorized by law, it was subject to the law of the land, but it
was not subject to judicial procedures. 
C. The Judicial Procedures for Enforcing the Law of the Land During War
We are now in a position to summarize how deprivations of rights during
war were subject to the law of the land under English law.  This formed the
backdrop for the American understanding of due process during war.
A state of war changed the rights and duties not only of belligerent sov-
ereigns under the law of nations; it also changed the rights and duties of
those sovereigns’ subjects, enemies, and neutrals according to the nation’s
municipal law.  England had largely incorporated the law of war into the law
183 MALTBY, supra note 175, at 1.
184 See 3 Car. 1 (1627) (Eng.); 31 Car. 2, c.1 (1679) (Eng.); MATTHEW HALE, THE HIS-
TORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND (6th ed. London, Henry Butterworth 1820) (1739).
185 See TYTLER, supra note 175, at 367–68.
186 Id. at 368.
187 Id. at 154.
188 See id. at 376–78 (template for statute authorizing martial law); id. at 402–10
(reprinting an act passed in 1798 authorizing martial law over Ireland).
189 See MALTBY, supra note 175, at 1 (describing military law as part of the “laws of the
land”).
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of the land.  Virtually all deprivations of rights during war were thus subject
to the law of the land in the sense of being subject to the rule of law.
Some deprivations of rights during war, though subject to law, were not
subject to judicial procedures.  Military conduct on the battlefield was not
subject to judicial review, though it was subject to the law of nations, enforce-
able through political mechanisms.  As discussed below, POWs were not enti-
tled to habeas, but those detained as POWs within the jurisdiction of the
courts of Westminster could use habeas to challenge their status.  As dis-
cussed above, deprivations pursuant to a statutory authorization of military
dictatorship were not subject to judicial procedures.
Yet many deprivations of rights during war were subject to the judicial
procedure requirement of Chapter 29 and its statutory and common-law off-
spring.  English courts used a variety of judicial procedures to enforce the law
of the land during war.  Among them were habeas corpus, civil-law procedure
in prize cases, and suits against officers.
1. Habeas Corpus
By the late eighteenth century, the courts at Westminster issued writs of
habeas corpus to review the lawfulness of detention.  The writ was available at
common law and by statute (the Habeas Corpus Act). 190  Parliament could,
and did, suspend the statutory writ during periods of insurrection, rebellion,
and war by authorizing detentions notwithstanding laws to the contrary.191
The Crown could not unilaterally suspend the writ, even during war.  And
even during war, the courts at Westminster continued to issue the writ at
common law.192
Absent a parliamentary suspension of the writ, habeas did not change
during war.  Subjects and friendly aliens were certainly entitled to the writ
during war.  Scholars dispute whether peaceful resident enemy aliens were
entitled to the writ.  Philip Hamburger has argued that the presumption was
that a resident enemy alien was outside the protection of the law.  Only an
express royal license would have entitled a resident enemy alien to the
writ.193
Paul Halliday, who has performed the most extensive research to date
on habeas corpus from 1500 to 1800, argues that there is little to no evidence
that alienage of any kind made any difference to the writ’s availability.194
According to Halliday, absent suspension (or martial law), the writ was availa-
ble to anyone detained by the King’s officers.195  As a prerogative writ, Crown
courts issued it to supervise the King’s agents.  This rationale would have
applied with equal force to detentions of resident enemy aliens.  As we shall
190 HALLIDAY, supra note 54, at 240.  The Habeas Corpus Act applied only to imprison-
ment for felony or treason. Id. at 242.
191 Id. at 247–56.
192 Id. at 249–50.
193 See supra subsection I.B.2.
194 HALLIDAY, supra note 54, at 206.
195 Id.
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see, American jurists during the early republic appeared to believe that
enemy aliens were entitled to habeas corpus to challenge the lawfulness of
their detention (though they could be lawfully detained or removed accord-
ing to statute).196
The only category of people who were not entitled to habeas corpus
were POWs.  Those held as POWs could, however, use the writ to show that
they were not really prisoners of war, and therefore entitled to release.197
Upon a petitioner’s affidavit claiming miscategorization, the court would
require the government to provide a reason for the detention.  So even those
held as prisoners of war were entitled to some judicial procedures to chal-
lenge their status even though POWs were not entitled to the writ.
2. Prize Cases
As discussed above, prize cases were one of the most common and thor-
ough examples of the provision of not only law but judicial process for alien
enemies and neutrals during war.  A state of war authorized a sovereign to
capture enemy vessels and cargo on the high seas, to capture neutral vessels
and cargo that violated the laws of neutrality, and to condemn them accord-
ing to the law of nations.  Each nation had its own admiralty court that pro-
ceeded according to civil law procedures and applied settled rules of capture
under the law of nations.  England’s admiralty courts were separate from the
common-law courts at Westminster and they had exclusive jurisdiction over
prize cases.  Yet according to English jurists, the law those courts applied was
the law of the land.  Moreover, like all other civilized nations, England had
unique rules of capture.  The courts would evaluate the lawfulness of cap-
tures, condemn enemy property, and divide prize awards according to the
rules of English admiralty law, rules that may differ from the rules of other
nations.  Captures and condemnations without lawful authority were unlaw-
ful, had no effect on title to the property, and were subject to suit for mari-
time trespass.  In other words, deprivations of the property rights of unarmed
enemies and neutrals on the high seas were subject not only to the rule of law
but also to an elaborate and well-known set of judicial procedures.198
3. Suits Against Officers
As a general matter, royal officials were subject to the same common-law
rules of trespass, false imprisonment, and implied contract as any other per-
son.199  Officials sued for trespass could defend themselves by showing that
the deprivation of rights was authorized by law.  Without such a special
196 See infra Section V.C.
197 HALLIDAY, supra note 54, at 168–75.
198 See supra subsection III.A.2.
199 See A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
114–15 (1982).
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defense, however, the official was held liable for damages.200  As we have
seen, this rule extended to military officers and courts martial.201  It also
extended to governors outside the realm who derived their authority from
the Crown.202  Many common lawyers believed these suits enforced Chapter
29 and its progeny.203
Though I am not aware of cases arising during war, the right to sue
officers apparently did not automatically disappear during war.  In some
cases, resident enemy aliens were held to lose the right to sue (anyone) dur-
ing war unless the Crown had expressly granted them license to do so.  By the
end of the eighteenth century, the common-law courts frowned on defend-
ants claiming the enemy alien disability as a bar to suit.204  Yet there was no
common-law bar on one who had been subject to the enemy alien disability
suing an officer after war for the defendant’s conduct during war.  Just so,
the courts provided process of law as a deterrent to unlawful deprivations of
rights during war.205
When Parliament authorized detentions notwithstanding the Habeas
Corpus Act, it sometimes also indemnified officers (and sometimes lay-
men).206  Both provisions—the authorization of detention and the elimina-
tion of personal liability—would have been necessary to eliminate the full
scope of judicial procedure rights under the law of the land.  By implication,
where Parliament did not indemnify officers during war, they would be per-
sonally liable for unlawful deprivations of rights.  As we shall see, U.S. courts
likewise held military officers liable for unlawful deprivations of rights arising
on the high seas and in foreign territory during periods of quasi war and
declared war.207
IV. THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
Americans inherited the English understanding of the relationship
between the law of war, martial law, and the law of the land.  They also inher-
ited the English notion of the law of the land requirement of Chapter 29,
200 See generally JAMES E. PFANDER, CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS AND THE WAR ON TERROR 4–5
(2017).
201 Glynn v. Houston (1841) 133 Eng. Rep. 775; 2 Man. & G. 337 (upholding award
against governor of Gibraltar for false imprisonment of a civilian); Mostyn v. Fabrigas
(1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1021, 1026, 1029; 1 Cowp. 160, 169 (discussing Comyn v. Sabine,
upholding an award against the governor of Gibraltar for unlawful punishment pursuant
to court martial).
202 See Fabrigas v. Mostyn (1773) 20 Howell’s State Trials 81, 228 (Eng.) (opinion by
Lord Mansfield) (affirming judgment against military governor of Minorca for unlawful
detention and banishment of native Minorcan); see also Cooke v. Maxwell (1817) 171 Eng.
Rep. 614; 2 Stark. 183 (holding the governor of Sierra Leone liable for unlawful arrest of
an American subject outside of the colony of Sierra Leone).
203 See supra Section II.B.
204 HALLIDAY, supra note 54, at 207.
205 See Lockington v. Smith, 15 F. Cas. 758 (C.C.D. Pa. 1817) (No. 8488).
206 HALLIDAY, supra note 54, at 254.
207 See infra Section V.D.
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which in the vast majority of cases merged a rule of law and a judicial proce-
dure requirement.  The American approach to these issues during the War of
Independence showed that Americans were sensitive to the requirements of
the law of nations even as they were still sorting out the details of their new
state and federal constitutional regimes.
Upon adopting the U.S. Constitution, Americans did not abandon the
English commitments to the rule of law and judicial procedure during war.
In fact, they doubled down on them.  Unlike the English Constitution, which
lodged the bulk of the responsibility for determining war and peace with the
monarch, the U.S. Constitution made it clear that the government’s wartime
activities would be governed by law.  The Constitution also expressly provided
conditions upon which the government could suspend the writ of habeas
corpus and authorize soldiers to occupy private property during war.  In light
of the English history and the constitutional text it is clear that the Due Pro-
cess Clause enshrined the right of judicial procedure for a wide number of
deprivations of rights during war.  As Part III shows, a number of debates,
practices, and judicial decisions in the early republic confirm this
understanding.
A. The American War of Independence
Writing in 1826, Chancellor James Kent began his lectures on the law of
the United States by situating the nation’s origin within the law of nations.
“When the United States ceased to be a part of the British empire, and
assumed the character of an independent nation, they became subject to that
system of rules which reason, morality, and custom had established among
the civilized nations of Europe, as their public law.”208
The Declaration of Independence had been an appeal to the law of
nations,209 the Continental Congress committed itself to operating according
to the law of nations,210 and General George Washington took care to abide
by that law throughout the war.211  The Americans’ experience during and
after the war demonstrates their acceptance of the basic contours of the
English legal framework.
In 1776, Congress declared that the “united Colonies” were an indepen-
dent state and therefore “have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, con-
tract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things
which Independent States may of right do.”212  The power to make war
entailed all the rights of war, and the corresponding diminution of individual
rights, under the law of war.  As each of the new states were sovereign within
208 1 KENT, supra note 129, at 1.
209 See DAVID ARMITAGE, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A GLOBAL HISTORY 28–29
(2007).
210 See 1 KENT, supra note 129, at 1.
211 See generally WITT, supra note 31, at 15–27 (describing Washington’s conduct of the
war).
212 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776).
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their own territory, they each exercised the rights of war, as did the confeder-
acy of states through Congress.213
Many state assemblies authorized their executives to enforce martial law
in some or all of the state for some portion of the war.214  This is unsurpris-
ing since, besides the high seas, the bulk of the fighting during the war
occurred within the states.  State assemblies variously suspended habeas
corpus and authorized the trial of some civilians (especially those who were
close to the military front) by court martial.215  Consistent with English tradi-
tion, and according to each state’s constitutional structure, all of this was
authorized by legislative act.216
State assemblies also confiscated, sequestered, or otherwise impaired the
property rights of those who remained loyal to Britain.  These laws sought to
implement the states’ perceived rights under the law of nations by diminish-
ing the property rights of enemies.217  The Treaty of Paris, which ended the
war, recognized the rights of British creditors and forbade future confisca-
tions.218  The states’ failure to recognize those rights gave rise to numerous
legal disputes.219
Although state assemblies and executives were in many cases at the front
lines of managing the legal repercussions of the war, the Confederation Con-
gress took the lead in implementing the states’ rights and responsibilities
under the laws of war.  The Articles of Confederation delegated authority to
Congress to manage most of the Confederation’s “external sovereignty.”220
Article IX granted the power to determine peace and war, to exchange
ambassadors, to enter into treaties and alliances, to establish rules for decid-
ing cases of capture and prize on land or water, to grant letters of marque
and reprisal in times of peace, and to appoint courts for the trial of pirates
and courts of appeals in all cases of capture.221
It is apparent from Congress and General Washington’s conduct during
the war that they understood these powers to authorize the Confederation
forces to deprive persons—enemies, neutrals, and subjects alike—of rights
consistent with the law of war, and according to municipal law.  Indeed, Con-
gress exercised more control over military law and martial law than Parlia-
ment traditionally had done.  Unlike Parliament, Congress itself enacted
articles of war that governed the Continental Army and subjected soldiers to
213 See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 221, 231 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.)
(discussing the rights of war exercised by the states and the confederacy).
214 Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Sweeping Domestic War Powers of Congress, 113
MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1351–67 (2015).
215 Id. at 1352.
216 See id.
217 Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 221, 231 (opinion of Chase, J.).
218 Definitive Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., arts. IV, VI, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80 [here-
inafter Treaty of Peace].
219 Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 199; see 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 741–49 (1971).
220 Penhallow v. Doane’s Adm’rs, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 91 (1795).
221 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1777, art. IX.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-2\NDL204.txt unknown Seq: 38 18-DEC-18 7:06
676 notre dame law review [vol. 94:2
the jurisdiction of courts martial.222  The Articles also applied to “suttlers and
retailers to a camp” and anyone “serving with the continental army in the
field.”223  During the course of the war, Congress specifically authorized
courts martial to punish spies lurking around or in military camps,224 those
who supplied intelligence or other aid to the enemy,225 the inhabitants of
particular British-occupied towns who aided the enemy,226 and those who
kidnapped Americans within seventy miles of Continental or state armies.227
Congress also specifically authorized General Washington to confiscate cer-
tain personal property at the front.228  By today’s standards, Congress’s legis-
lative control over the army’s authority to deprive persons, even enemies, of
rights would be considered micromanagement.
General Washington took it for granted that the army’s authority came
from congressional delegation and that its conduct was governed by the law
of nations.229  When he needed more discretion, he asked for it, and Con-
gress usually accommodated him.230  He did not hesitate to exercise this del-
egated power in ways that were necessary to win the war, including having
civilians tried and punished (according to law) by court martial.231  Yet he
“generally favored” trial by civilian courts, when possible, “over the use of
military courts.”232  Washington was diligent to observe the limits of Con-
gress’s delegated authority, and in the absence of municipal restrictions, the
limits imposed by the law of nations.233
Much of the nation’s war effort occurred on the high seas.  Congress
authorized a navy and commissioned privateers to capture enemy and neu-
tral vessels as prize.  Privateering was popular and, in some cases, lucrative.
By one estimate in the House of Lords, American privateers “capture[d] or
destroyed” over 700 ships with cargoes “worth over ten million dollars,”234 or
well over three times the number of ships taken by the Continental navy.235
Congress established rules of capture and prize for the navy236 and pri-
222 2 J. CONT’L CONG. 116 (1775).
223 Id.
224 5 J. CONT’L CONG. 693 (1776).
225 Id. at 799.
226 9 J. CONT’L CONG. 784 (1777).
227 10 J. CONT’L CONG. 204–05 (1778).
228 8 J. CONT’L CONG. 752 (1777) (for sixty days and within seventy miles of
headquarters).
229 WITT, supra note 31, at 15–27.
230 See Prakash, supra note 214, at 1362–63.
231 Id. at 1362.
232 Id.
233 WITT, supra note 31, at 15–27.
234 EDGAR STANTON MACLAY, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRIVATEERS, at xiii (New York, D.
Appleton & Co. 1899).
235 ROBERT H. PATTON, PATRIOT PIRATES: THE PRIVATEER WAR FOR FREEDOM AND FOR-
TUNE IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 110–12 (2008); Deirdre Mask & Paul MacMahon, The
Revolutionary War Prize Cases and the Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 477,
487–88 (2015).
236 See 3 J. CONT’L CONG. 381 (1775).
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vateers.237  Congress urged states to give prize jurisdiction to their own
courts238 and exercised increasing authority over them with a special com-
mittee that heard appeals,239 effectively the nation’s first federal court.240  As
with Congress’s regulation of the war on land, its regulation of captures at
sea was a model of exercising the nation’s rights under the law of war accord-
ing to its own municipal law.
A major shortcoming of the Articles of Confederation was that Congress
lacked the authority necessary to exercise the nation’s external sovereignty
effectively.241  Congress had to rely entirely on the states to raise money and
armies242 and had no authority to prevent the states from interfering in for-
eign affairs.243  In particular, Congress had no way to chastise states that
appropriated British creditors in violation of the Treaty of Peace.244  A key
motivation for a new Constitution was the need for a government with the
internal power necessary to make war and to secure peace.245
B. Rereading the U.S. Constitution
The U.S. Constitution sought to remedy these problems by giving the
federal government power to affect personal rights and duties sufficient to
meet the nation’s responsibilities under the law of nations.  Other scholars
have ably provided a more comprehensive account of the drafting and ratify-
ing history bearing on the original understanding of the war powers.246  This
Section situates the key drafting debates and constitutional text in light of the
English and revolutionary understanding of the relationship of the law of war
and the law of the land.  From that standpoint, the evidence strongly sup-
ports the view that the Constitution gave the nation’s power to initiate a state
237 Id. at 371; see also 4 J. CONT’L CONG. 230–32, 251–53 (1776) (authorizing privateers
to capture private, as well as public, British vessels).
238 See 1 GOEBEL, supra note 219, at 148.
239 See generally 17 J. CONT’L CONG. 458–59 (1780); 131 J.C. BANCROFT DAVIS, Federal
Courts Prior to the Adoption of the Constitution, in CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT AT
OCTOBER TERM, 1888, at xix, xxiii (New York, Banks & Bros. 1889); 1 GOEBEL, supra note
219, at 150–69; William F. Swindler, Seedtime of an American Judiciary: From Independence to the
Constitution, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 503, 513–14 (1976).
240 HENRY J. BOURGUIGNON, THE FIRST FEDERAL COURT 90–91 (1977).
241 See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 3, 4 (John Jay). See generally MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLU-
TION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF
THE AMERICAN STATE 101–14 (2003).
242 See FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF
THE CONSTITUTION 143–83 (1985).
243 21 J. CONT’L CONG. 1136–37 (1781) (recommending that the states improve their
prosecution and punishment of crimes against the law of nations); ABRAHAM D. SOFAER,
WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 16 (1976).
244 See generally Treaty of Peace, supra note 218.
245 EDLING, supra note 241, at 101–14.
246 See, e.g., MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 218–56
(2007); SOFAER, supra note 243, at 25–60; Michael W. McConnell, The President Who
Would Not Be King 22–28, 128–39 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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of war or limited hostilities that changed the rights of individuals to Con-
gress.  The Constitution gave the duty to enforce the law of war, as adopted
and elaborated by Congress, or as triggered by the initiation of a juridical
state of war against the United States, to the President.  And it gave the power
to review the lawfulness of many deprivations during war to the federal
courts.  The Due Process Clause summarized this constitutional division of
power over war and subjected many deprivations during war to ordinary judi-
cial procedures.
1. Congress Versus the President
The most widely debated question about the war powers is the extent to
which the President can engage the nation’s military in hostilities without
express congressional authority.  The question arises in part from textual
ambiguity.  The Constitution appears to split the war powers between Con-
gress and the President.  It gives Congress the power to “declare [w]ar”247
and to make various laws governing hostilities short of a declaration of
war,248 and it gives the President “the executive [p]ower” and the office of
the Commander in Chief of the armed forces.249  But this enumeration of
powers does not expressly address several recurring situations: What is the
President’s authority to use the military defensively in the absence of congres-
sional approval?  What is Congress’s power to prescriptively cabin the Presi-
dent’s exercise of force, such as with the War Powers Resolution?  These
questions about the war powers have dominated disputes during the Cold
War, the Vietnam conflict, and the war on terrorism.250
One strategy for resolving these questions is to treat the Vesting Clause
of Article II as a watershed.  It gives “the executive [p]ower,” seemingly all of
it, to the President.  In English constitutional theory, the Crown had the
power to declare war, manage the military forces, and negotiate peace.251
Thus, a sensible strategy for interpreting the Constitution’s allocation of
247 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
248 See id. cl. 12 (the Marque and Reprisal Clause); id. cl. 13 (the Captures Clause); id.
cl. 14 (the Army Clause); id. cl. 15 (the Navy Clause); id. cl. 16 (the Military Regulations
Clause); id. cl. 17 (the Militia Clause); id. cl. 18 (the Organizing the Militia Clause); id. cl.
19 (the Enclave Clause”); id. cl. 20 (the Military Installations Clause).
249 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the
actual Service of the United States . . . .”).
250 Philip Bobbitt, Essay, War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely’s War and Responsibility:
Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and its Aftermath, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1364, 1373 (1994)
(explaining that “virtually all commentary on this subject falls into one of two positions,”
whether “Congress has the exclusive power to determine whether to introduce forces into
war, though in emergencies the President may act” or not); see Robert J. Delahunty & John
Yoo, Response, Making War, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 123 (2007); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash,
The Separation and Overlap of War and Military Powers, 87 TEX. L. REV. 299 (2008); Michael D.
Ramsey, Response, The President’s Power to Respond to Attacks, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 169
(2007).
251 See, e.g., WOODDESON, supra note 159, at 94–95.
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power to make war is to ascertain the meaning of “executive power,” to sub-
tract the executive powers expressly given to Congress, and to assign the rest
to the President.252
The problem with this approach is that, as we have seen, making war was
not a purely executive function.  This was so in two senses.  The Crown’s
power to declare war and conclude peace had important legislative implica-
tions, changing not only the nation’s rights vis-a`-vis other sovereigns, but also
the rights of enemies, neutrals, and subjects under the law of England.253
Furthermore, by the late eighteenth century Parliament had a significant
role to play in British war making.  Parliament controlled the purse,254
authorized the buildup of troops, enacted or authorized military law and
courts martial, and, at the beginning of every war, enacted a law authorizing
captures on the high seas and allocating the proceeds of prize awards.255  All
of this was done as an exercise of legislative power so far as it was done by
making law.  Courts martial and prize courts applied law that was either writ-
ten or expressly authorized by Parliament, and common-law courts policed
the jurisdiction of those courts with writs of habeas corpus and damages
awards.  The entire war-making function of the British Constitution was cir-
cumscribed by, and subject to, the law of the land.
The members of the Philadelphia Convention were intimately aware of
these implications of the law of nations and how the English Constitution
addressed them.  Upon the proposal that the executive power be placed into
the hands of a single magistrate, James Wilson agreed, but stipulated that the
example of “the Prerogatives of the British Monarch” “was inapplicable to the
situation of this Country; the extent of which was so great, and the manners
so republican, that nothing but a great confederated Republic would do for
it.”256  According to James Madison’s notes, Wilson explained that “[s]ome
of these prerogatives were of a Legislative nature.  Among others that of war
& peace &c.  The only powers he conceived strictly Executive were those of
executing the laws, and appointing officers, not (appertaining to and)
appointed by the Legislature.”257
252 See, e.g., Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1, reprinted in ALEXANDER HAMILTON ET
AL., THE FEDERALIST, ON THE NEW CONSTITUTION, WRITTEN IN 1788, at 405 (Hallowell, Mas-
ters, Smith & Co. 1852); see RAMSEY, supra note 246, at 219; Saikrishna B. Prakash &
Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 253–54
(2001); McConnell, supra note 246, at 130 (explaining that the debate over the war powers
illustrated Corwin’s theory of “reciprocally limiting” powers); see also EDWARD S. CORWIN,
THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787–1957 (4th rev. ed. 1957).
253 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 65–66 (Max Farrand ed.,
rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter FEDERAL CONVENTION] (James Wilson arguing that the Crown’s
prerogatives of war and peace were legislative in nature).
254 SOFAER, supra note 243, at 9.  The Crown could and sometimes did borrow money
when Parliament was not forthcoming. See id. at 10.
255 See supra Part II.
256 1 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 253, at 65–66.
257 Id.
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Some scholars have suggested that by placing the prerogatives of war
and peace “[a]mong others,” he was designating them as neither legislative
nor “strictly executive.”258  Others have maintained that Wilson meant that
the powers of war and peace were among other legislative powers.259  Many,
including Wilson, probably would have understood the powers of war and
peace to entail both legislative and executive functions aimed at the nation’s
external affairs, or to be “federative,” in the words of John Locke.260
Nevertheless, the best view of the debate is that Wilson was emphasizing
the importance of placing a republic’s power of “determining on peace and
war,” as the Articles of Confederation put it, in the hands of the legisla-
ture.261  Wilson and the other Framers knew that war changed the law—not
only the law between belligerent states, but the municipal law as well.
Together with Madison’s notes, the other accounts of the debate confirm this
understanding.262  Pierce wrote that Wilson argued that “[m]aking peace
and war are generally determined by Writers on the Laws of Nations to be
legislative powers.”263  King wrote that Madison agreed with Wilson “in his
difinition [sic] of executive powers—executive powers ex vi termini [out of
the force of the boundary, or by definition], do not include the Rights of war
& peace &c.”264  Note that, according to King, Madison referred not to the
powers of war and peace, but the “Rights of war & peace,” which is to put the
matter in the terms of the law of nations.  And so King’s notes suggest that
Madison and Wilson agreed that the nation’s power or right to enter into war
and peace was legislative, not executive.  The reason was likely because enter-
ing into war and peace changes the law.
This understanding also sheds light on the implications of the Framers’
later debate over whether to give Congress the power to make war or to
merely declare it.  According to Blackstone, the powers to make and to
declare war were not the same thing.  To “make war” was broader, and it
meant to engage in war.  To “declare war” meant to formally “make a war
completely effectual.”265  While a declaration of war was sufficient to create a
258 See McConnell, supra note 246, at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted).
259 David Gray Adler, The President’s War-Making Power, in INVENTING THE AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY 119, 131 (Thomas E. Cronin ed., 1989); Thomas E. Cronin, The President’s Exec-
utive Power, in INVENTING THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra, 180, 184; Arthur Bestor, Separa-
tion of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The Intent of the Constitution Historically Examined,
5 SETON HALL L. REV. 527, 576 (1974).
260 See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 76–77 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
1980) (1690); McConnell, supra note 246, at 24.
261 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX.
262 Scholars have emphasized that Madison edited his notes for publication in light of
subsequent events, including a political career. See MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND:
REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (2015).  This makes the other notes of the
debates, though less thorough than Madison’s, all the more useful for reconstructing the
arguments.
263 1 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 253, at 73–74.
264 Id. at 70.
265 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at *258.
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juridical state of war, it was not necessary: a nation could enter into war by
initiating (or suffering) hostilities.  As discussed above, in England, both
making and declaring war were prerogatives of the Crown.  The Articles of
Confederation, by contrast, gave “the sole and exclusive right and power of
determining on peace and war” to Congress. 266  The New Jersey Plan had rec-
ommended this language.
The Committee of Detail returned a draft of the Constitution that would
have given Congress the power to make war.  Upon the joint motion of
Madison and Gerry, and after some debate, the Framers decided to change
the provision to the power to “declare” war.267  The reasons given were that
giving the power to “make” war to Congress might restrict the President from
“repel[ling] sudden attacks” or be construed to give Congress the power to
“conduct” war, which was an executive function.268  Some scholars have
argued that restricting Congress’s power to declaring war left the power to
make war, including the power to begin hostilities, with the President
through the clause vesting him with the executive power.269  In light of the
law of nations, which clearly influenced earlier discussion about the nature of
the war powers, however, it seems unlikely that the Framers believed the
power to initiate a war was a strictly executive function.  Beginning a war
changed the law.  War’s law-changing character strongly suggests that the
Framers intended to give all of the power to begin a war to Congress.  This
makes sense of the reasons the delegates gave for changing “make” to
“declare”: repelling sudden attacks and conducting war do not change the
law, they simply require the Commander in Chief to act according to an
existing state of war.270  In other words, those functions are consistent with
simply executing the law, rather than changing it.  Under this account, the
“Declare War” Clause gives Congress more than the power to simply initiate a
war through a formal declaration.271  Congress also has the power to begin a
war by authorizing hostilities that amount to the initiation of a state of war
266 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, para. 1 (emphasis added).  The New
Jersey Plan had recommended the same language as the Articles of Confederation. See 1
FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 253, at 243.  Hamilton’s proposal at the constitutional
convention would have given the Senate “the sole power of declaring war” and the execu-
tive “the direction of war when authorized or begun.” Id. at 292.
267 The convention rejected proposals to lodge the power to make war exclusively in
the Senate or the President.  2 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 253, at 318–19.
268 Id.
269 See John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1666–67
(2002).
270 This explains the difference between Congress’s power to declare war and the provi-
sion that the states may not “make” war. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.  Unlike the federal
government, the states may neither plunge the nation into war nor conduct warfare when
the nation is in a state of war.  See id.
271 See RAMSEY, supra note 246, at 222–37; Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Exhuming the
Seemingly Moribund Declaration of War, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 89, 89 (2008) (“Whenever
Congress authorizes or commands a war, it has issued a declaration of war, regardless of
whether Congress uses the phrase ‘declare war.’”).
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under the law of nations, thus changing the law.  As discussed in more detail
below, this is exactly how early commentators interpreted the Constitution’s
division of war powers.
2. Congress
The Constitution’s other assignments of power regarding the nation’s
“rights of war” further confirm that the nation’s exercise of those rights, and
therefore its authority to deprive persons of individual rights, are subject to
municipal law.
Article I, Section 8 gives Congress a number of specific powers related to
war.  Altogether these provisions give Congress all the power necessary to
control every policy decision regarding the prosecution of war, and to do so
by legislation that implements the nation’s rights of war by changing individ-
ual rights under municipal law.  Besides the power to declare war, Congress
has the power to call forth the militia to enforce federal law and defend
against rebellion or invasion.272  The powers to tax and spend “for the com-
mon Defence,”273 “[t]o raise and support Armies,”274 and “[t]o provide and
maintain a Navy”275 give Congress the authority not only to control the size
of the nation’s military establishment, but also, tacitly, to end a war or other
conflict.  All Congress must do is to stop appropriating federal funds for mili-
tary use.
The maritime provisions of Section 8 are easy to overlook for their anti-
quated language, but in the eighteenth century they were central to the
power to control individual rights during war.  The power to make rules for
captures on land and sea was the power to determine whose property would
be subject to capture, upon what conditions, according to what procedures,
and by whom.276  Similarly, the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal
gave Congress the authority to authorize attacks on other nations that would
not necessarily constitute a declaration of war under the law of nations.277
For a maritime nation, these provisions amounted to absolute congressional
control over the nation’s degree of belligerence toward enemy sovereigns
and its degree of tolerance toward neutral sovereigns.278  These powers also
gave Congress control over the individual rights of property of enemy and
neutral subjects,279 and probably included the authority to authorize the
punishment of citizens for trading with the enemy.
272 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 15.
273 Id. cl. 1.
274 Id. cl. 12.
275 Id. cl. 13.
276 Id. cl. 11. See generally Ingrid Wuerth, The Captures Clause, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683
(2009).
277 See RAMSEY, supra note 246, at 231.
278 See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177–78 (1804); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4
Dall.) 37, 43 (1800).
279 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
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The power to make rules for the government of the armed forces,280 the
militia when in federal service,281 and federal military installations, such as
forts, arsenals, and dockyards, ensured that the Commander in Chief’s man-
agement of the military would be subject to law.282
Together with the Declare War Clause and the Necessary and Proper
Clause, these provisions of Article I should be understood to give Congress
the authority to change the nation’s rights and responsibilities under the law
of nations from the rights of peace to the rights of war.  As an incident of this
power, Congress has the authority to change the rights and responsibilities of
enemies, neutrals, and citizens during war.283
3. The President
Article II of the Constitution gives the executive power and various other
powers and duties to the President.  The above discussion suggests that the
residual war powers delegated to the President principally consist of execut-
ing the law during war and commanding the armed forces.  The latter
responsibility likely includes the power, perhaps even the duty, to respond to
attacks with force.  What Article II does not give the President is the power to
change the law, including the law governing individual rights and duties dur-
ing war.  Instituting hostilities that would amount to the declaration of war—
to changing the municipal law from a code of peace to one of war—is
beyond the President’s purview.
The Vesting Clause of Article II gives the President “the executive
Power.”284  The core of this power was understood to be the authority to
execute the law.285  It should be read in tandem with the President’s duty
under the Take Care Clause to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted.”286  The latter duty also tacitly authorizes the President to carefully
delegate authority to execute the laws to subordinate officers.  In light of the
above framework, these provisions must be understood to empower and obli-
gate the President to follow the law during war, including the law of war to
the extent that it has been adopted into the law of the land.287  When Con-
gress changes the law, including during war, the President must see that it is
faithfully executed.  Whether, and how, war may change the law in the
absence of an express congressional act, for instance, upon an enemy’s decla-
ration of war against the United States, is a crucial question that the Constitu-
tion does not clearly address.  Unsurprisingly, early statesmen and jurists
280 Id. cl. 14.
281 Id. cl. 16.
282 Id. cl. 17.
283 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 1790–1802 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906) [hereinaf-
ter Madison].
284 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
285 See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 570–81 (1994).
286 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
287 See Dodge, supra note 126.
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debated it.  As discussed below, though they disagreed on some of the partic-
ulars, they all agreed that war changes the law, the President is bound by that
law, and that Congress is ultimately supreme in its authority to determine the
law during war, and thus to direct the President’s authority to execute the
law.288
The Commander-in-Chief Clause gives the President the authority to
command the armed forces—the U.S. Army and Navy and the state militias
“when called into the actual Service of the United States.”289  The power was
based on the Crown’s prerogative to command troops, but the power given
to the President was a shell of the power exercised by the Crown.  Article I of
the Constitution assigned many of the powers incidental to the exercise of
the commander-in-chief power to Congress: the power to raise the army and
navy, to create rules and regulations for them, to purchased real estate for
them, etc.290  The principal purpose of the clause was to make it clear that
the President, and no one else, would be the highest officer in the military
chain of command.  The armed forces would be directed by a civilian elected
for a limited term through the Constitution’s prescribed electoral process.
As Michael McConnell has put it, “[t]he Commander-in-Chief Clause estab-
lishes a chain of command, with the President constitutionally entrenched
on top, but the scope of powers available to the military are essentially legisla-
tively rather than constitutionally determined.”291  There is no textual or his-
torical reason to think that the Commander-in-Chief Clause gives the
President discretion to ignore the law during war.292
4. The Federal Courts
We have seen the ways in which the U.S. Constitution ensures that the
definition and deprivation of rights during war would be subject to law.  To
see how many of those deprivations would also be subject to judicial proce-
dure requirements, consider the Constitution’s delegation of power to the
federal courts.  Article III allocates “the judicial Power of the United States”
to “one supreme Court” and to lower courts as Congress may provide.293
That power includes cases arising under the “Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties,” as well as “admiralty and maritime Jurisdic-
tion.”294  Vesting these powers in the same court effectively merged the
English common-law courts and the court of admiralty.  In England, there
was an ancient rivalry between the admiralty courts and the courts of com-
mon law.  By the late eighteenth century, the common-law courts maintained
288 See infra Section V.A (discussing Alexander Hamilton and James Madison’s debate
during the neutrality controversy); see also Dodge, supra note 126, at 1564–66.
289 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
290 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12–14, 16–17.
291 McConnell, supra note 246, at 157–58.
292 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
293 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
294 Id. § 2.
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their supremacy by issuing writs of prohibition when the courts of admiralty
overstepped their jurisdiction.295  But common-law courts did not correct
admiralty courts for error.  In prize cases, appeals lay to a special commission
composed principally of the Privy Council.296  Prize condemnations and dis-
tributions were therefore under the Crown’s purview.
By giving Congress the power to make rules governing captures and fed-
eral courts the power to adjudicate cases arising under those rules, the Con-
stitution more fully integrated the law of prize into the law of the land.  In
cases involving captures at sea, including prize cases, the federal courts would
be responsible to enforce the separation of powers.  Because Article I vested
the power to govern captures in Congress, each U.S. capture would have to
stem from statutory authority, and courts would have the power to condemn
enemy property only when the capture accorded with U.S. municipal law that
implemented the nation’s rights under the law of nations.  Officers exceed-
ing their statutory authority would be subject to personal liability.297  As dis-
cussed more fully below, prize cases were one of the most common examples
of the provision of the judicial procedure requirements of due process to
enemies and neutrals during war.
5. Constitutional Limits with Exceptions for War
a. The Suspension Clause
Even without the Bill of Rights, the Constitution seems to presume that
the deprivation of rights during war would be subject to the law of the land.
The Suspension Clause of Article I provides: “The Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion the public Safety may require it.” 298  The Constitution nowhere
expressly guarantees the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and it
nowhere vests the power in the federal government to suspend it.  Yet the
Suspension Clause is a condition on its suspension.  Clearly the Framers
assumed that the writ would be available (either at common law, by statute,
or by constitutional implication) and that the government would have the
authority to suspend it.299  The Suspension Clause prohibits a suspension
unless the public safety requires it, and only in cases of rebellion or invasion,
295 See 1 WOODDESON, supra note 109, at *143.
296 Id.
297 See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177–78 (1804); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4
Dall.) 37, 43 (1800).
298 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; see TYLER, supra note 64, at 124–38 (survey of drafting
and ratification).
299 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82; Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 75, 94–95 (1807) (Marshall, C.J.) (suggesting that a statute was necessary to
authorize the federal courts to issue the writ). But see Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723
(2008) (holding that the Suspension Clause creates a right to habeas).  The drafting and
ratifying history strongly suggests that the founding generation believed that the Constitu-
tion created a right to habeas, though the Framers were unclear about which provision of
the Constitution did so. See TYLER, supra note, 64 at 124–35.
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i.e., during a domestic war.300  By implication, then, the government does
have the power to suspend the writ during a domestic war.  Where does that
power come from?
Most scholars who have studied the history agree that only Congress may
suspend habeas corpus.301  Yet Presidents have claimed the authority as an
incident of the executive power or the commander-in-chief power.302  The
foregoing argument that Congress has the exclusive power to change rights
during war adds fresh support for the view that Congress alone has authority
to suspend habeas corpus during war.  But what constitutional provision pro-
vides that power?
Saikrishna Prakash has argued that the Necessary and Proper Clause,
applied to all of Congress’s constitutional powers to govern ordinary life
within the territory of the United States, gives Congress “sweeping” powers
over domestic war, including the power to temporarily suspend habeas
corpus and set up a military dictatorship.303  Whether those powers are
sweeping or not, the Constitution appears to give Congress ample power dur-
ing war, in conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause, to authorize
detentions notwithstanding the statutory or common-law protections of
habeas.
By preserving habeas corpus, subject to constitutionally valid suspension,
the Suspension Clause goes a long way toward guaranteeing Chapter 29’s
judicial procedure requirement during war.  It guaranteed habeas as a mech-
anism to contest the lawfulness of a detention.  The only exceptions it may be
understood to incorporate are the traditional exceptions to the scope of the
writ.  As we shall see, American courts understood the writ to extend to resi-
dent enemy aliens.  The Due Process Clause would confirm and broaden
these judicial procedure requirements.
b. The Third Amendment
The Third Amendment reinforces the view that the Constitution
presumes that the government will deprive persons of rights during war only
by law and, ordinarily, subject to judicial review.  Now largely an answer to a
trivia question, the Third Amendment provides that “[n]o Soldier shall, in
time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner,
nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”304  The Amend-
ment is not an affirmative grant of power; rather it assumes that the govern-
ment has the power during war to quarter soldiers in a private house.  The
Third Amendment prohibits the nation from exercising that power except
(1) during “time of war” and (2) according to “a manner prescribed by
300 See Prakash, supra note 214.
301 TYLER, supra note 64, at 137–38; Prakash, supra note 214, at 1341.
302 Chief Justice Taney and President Lincoln famously tussled over the issue. See, e.g.,
Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487); Seth Barrett Tillman, Ex
Parte Merryman: Myth, History, and Scholarship, 224 MIL. L. REV. 481 (2016).
303 Prakash, supra note 214, at 1341.
304 U.S. CONST. amend. III.
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law.”305  The Third Amendment thus presumes that the nation has a right to
deprive residents of certain property during war, but that such deprivations
must be authorized by law, i.e., by Congress.  This implicitly confirms a gen-
eral rule that the government ordinarily may not deprive persons of prop-
erty—in this case, the enjoyment of their own house—even by law.
The Third Amendment probably also makes the quartering of soldiers
subject to judicial review.  The President could only quarter soldiers in a
“manner prescribed by law.”306  A case arising under that law would be within
the jurisdiction of the federal courts.  Through such review, federal courts
would provide the judicial procedure requirements of due process.
6. The Constitution and the Customary Law of Nations
The Constitution also affected the relationship between the law of
nations and other sources of municipal law, though it did not spell out the
details of that relationship.  Article VI declares that the Constitution, “the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof” and “all
Treaties . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”307  The point of the
Supremacy Clause was to make it clear that federal positive law would control
contrary state law.  It did not clarify the relationship between federal positive
law and unwritten law such as the customary law of nations.  Indeed, the pro-
vision “seems to preclude a textual argument that the Supremacy Clause’s
reference to the laws of the United States includes customary international
law.”308
The relationship between these laws is important.  When the nation is in
a state of war, does the law of war automatically change the rights and duties
of enemies, neutrals, and citizens?  Or must Congress change those rights
and duties pursuant to its enumerated powers?  Does it make a difference if
Congress declared war or another nation declared war on the United States?
When the President is defending against an attack and Congress has not yet
had time to declare war or specify rights, what law governs the rights of ene-
mies, neutrals, and citizens?  Put differently, perhaps, is the law of war part of
the general law applied by federal courts?
As we shall see, American statesmen and federal courts addressed all of
these questions, either directly or indirectly, in the early years of the republic.
Generally, they concluded that when the nation was in a state of war, the
customary law of war governed the rights of enemies and neutrals unless
Congress had enacted a law to the contrary.  The customary law of war was
thus part of federal law, though it was subordinate to the Constitution, fed-
eral statutes, and treaties—the “supreme Law of the Land.”309
305 Id.
306 Id.
307 Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
308 Dodge, supra note 126, at 1566 (citing RAMSEY, supra note 246, at 348–50).
309 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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Another important question is whether the law of war was a limit on the
federal government’s constitutional power.  Here we must distinguish
between the external and internal application of the law of war.
Externally, the law of war bound every sovereign equally.  Were Congress
and the President to depart from that law, the nation would be responsible
for violating its duties under the law of war and any aggrieved sovereign
would have rights of retaliation or reimbursement.  They would prosecute
these rights through politics, diplomacy, or military retaliation.310
Internally, however, the answer is different.  By providing that the Con-
stitution and laws are the supreme law of the land, the President would be
obligated to execute the Constitution and statutes, and the courts would be
obligated to apply them, even when doing so would violate a duty owed to
another nation under the customary law of nations.
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy,311
which gave rise to the Charming Betsy canon,312 captures this view of the inter-
nal relationship between federal positive law and the law of nations.  The
Constitution gives Congress the power to enact law that is contrary to the law
of nations, but the courts should interpret congressional acts to comply with
that law unless those acts manifest a clear intent to depart from it.  This
approach accounts for the incorporation of at least some of the law of
nations into the general law, the supremacy of federal positive law enshrined
in the Supremacy Clause, and the supremacy of Congress over federal law-
making enshrined in Article I.313
C. The Due Process Clause
Drawing on Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone, the Framers believed
that a constitution that properly combined and separated the legislative,
executive, and judicial powers would be the best security for political liberty
and individual rights.314  The so-called Antifederalists were less sanguine;
310 See, e.g., Hamburger, supra note 7, at 1951–55.
311 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
312 See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 685
(2000).
313 William Dodge has recently argued that Americans in the late eighteenth century,
following Vattel, would have understood that the nation was bound absolutely by the “vol-
untary” law of nations, which arose from the natural law, but that it could deliberately
depart from the “customary” law of nations.  Dodge, supra note 126.  See id. at 1569, for a
discussion of the “voluntary law” of nations.  While there is some evidence that Americans
may have believed the nation to be absolutely bound by the voluntary law of nations, it is
unclear what implications this would have had for the law governing the deprivation of
individual rights during war.  The “principles” Vattel listed as flowing from the voluntary
law of nations were pitched at a high level of abstraction and had to do with ensuring
equality of states and determining whether another nation’s conduct, on the whole, was
consistent with the law of nations—not with distinguishing between lawful and unlawful
deprivations of specific rights during war. See VATTEL, supra note 25, bk. III, §§ 120–23, at
534–36.
314 See SOFAER, supra note 243, at 43–44; THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
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they insisted on a Bill of Rights.  Enacted by the First Congress, under James
Madison’s leadership, the Bill of Rights included a provision that restated
what had come to be understood in the English tradition as the central con-
stitutional guarantee of individual rights: “No person shall . . . be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”315
As Michael McConnell and I have argued, American jurists understood
due process of law to require deprivations of rights only according to law,
including the separation of powers.  The vast majority of deprivations had to
be according to a general law enforced by the executive and applied by the
courts.316  Courts enforced due process through a variety of common-law and
statutory remedies.  Blackstone closely associated habeas and damages
actions against government officials with the right of due process.317
American constitutionalism involved two innovations on the English tra-
dition of due process: the separation of powers, and the elevation of due
process above the reach of the legislature.  Neither the President nor Con-
gress could satisfy due process unilaterally.  The Due Process Clause prohib-
ited Congress from enacting insufficiently general and prospective laws that
deprived specific persons of rights because such laws operated as judgments
rather than legislation.318
A constitutional due process provision also placed limits on a legisla-
ture’s authority to authorize deprivations without the safeguards of well-
established judicial procedures.319  The Supreme Court first implemented
this notion of due process in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co.,320 but state courts had applied it numerous times, especially when state
legislatures purported to authorize common-law proceedings without a jury
trial.321  Judicial procedures that complied with longstanding tradition were
consistent with due process of law.322  Accordingly, by 1820, Congress pro-
vided that an in rem proceeding to condemn a pirate vessel would amount to
“due process and trial.”323  Due process, as a requirement of judicial proce-
dure, summarized the traditional procedural protections of a court of law.
Unlike the Suspension Clause and the Third Amendment, the Due Pro-
cess Clause gives no indication that Congress may suspend it during war.  Its
text is universal.  Yet the meaning of “due process of law” had always been
based on tradition and context.  The process of law due before a deprivation
315 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Chapman & McConnell, supra note 75, at 1682–92.  Like
Coke and Blackstone, Americans seemed to think that the “law of the land” formula of
Magna Carta and the “due process of law” formula of the U.S. Constitution were synonyms.
Id.
316 Chapman & McConnell, supra note 75, at 1721–26.
317 See supra Part II.
318 Chapman & McConnell, supra note 75, at 1755.
319 Id. at 1773–77.
320 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
321 Chapman & McConnell, supra note 75, at 1773–77.
322 See Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 277.
323 An Act to Protect the Commerce of the United States, and Punish the Crime of
Piracy, ch. 77, § 4, 3 Stat. 510, 513 (1819); see Chapman, supra note 49, at 409–13.
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of life for a felony was different from the process of law due before a depriva-
tion of property in the Court of Exchequer.  As we have seen, the same is true
during war.  The process of law due before the Crown could detain a POW
was different than the process of law due before the Crown could deprive an
enemy alien of property rights in a vessel and cargo captured on the high
seas.
In light of the English background and the U.S. Constitution’s allocation
and limitations of powers, we are in a position to summarize the contours of
what American jurists may have understood the Due Process Clause to
require during war.  First, all governmental deprivations of rights during war
were subject to the law of the land.  This is the “rule of law” requirement
inherent in the “law of the land” provision of Chapter 29.  Whether under-
stood as a requirement of the Due Process Clause, as an implication of the
constitutional separation of powers, or both, the principle derives from the
English tradition and makes sense of many early American disputes about the
scope of rights during war.  As we shall see, early American jurists frequently
referred to such deprivations as being subject to the law of the land, even
when they did not mean to suggest that they were subject to judicial
procedures.
The Constitution implemented this principle by giving Congress charge
of determining the rights of individuals during war.  Congress had wide lati-
tude to determine the rights of resident enemy aliens.  Based on the English
history, there was a question about whether those aliens were presumptively
entitled to the protection of the law.  This was bound up with a question
about whether the customary law of nations was a part of the general com-
mon law, subject to change by Congress.  As we shall see, American jurists
debated these issues in the early republic.  Congress could even constitution-
ally suspend certain rights of citizens and resident friendly aliens during a
domestic war.
Second, the Due Process Clause, in connection with the various alloca-
tions of power in Articles I through III of the Constitution, required that
many deprivations of rights during war be subject to traditional judicial pro-
cedures.  For such deprivations of rights, the Due Process Clause combined
the “rule of law” and “judicial procedure” requirements of the common-law
understanding of Chapter 29.  In particular, the government’s authority to
deprive enemies and neutrals of rights on the high seas would be subject to
congressional authorization and review by an Article III court.  Congress
would set the rules for the military and, presumably, Article III courts would
have authority to ensure that courts martial followed the law.  The depriva-
tion of rights on the battlefield, or pursuant to a lawful declaration of martial
law, however, would not be subject to judicial procedure requirements.
POWs would of course not be entitled to release, but those held as POWs
could use habeas to challenge their status.
As Part V argues, early public debates and judicial decisions show that
Americans conceived of the relationship between the government’s power
and the rights of individuals during war in precisely these terms, relying heav-
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ily on the notion that the rights of individuals during war were subject to the
law of the land.  They rarely, however, expressly distinguished between the
rule of law and judicial procedure requirements of the law of the land, and
they rarely attributed these requirements to the Due Process Clause.  It is
only in light of the foregoing understanding of the English history and due
process of law that we can fully understand the implications of their
language.
V. EARLY IMPLEMENTATION
Early American legal thinkers consistently operated with the foregoing
framework as a conceptual backdrop.  This Part explores a handful of the
most important early cases that illustrate the framework’s application and
development.
A. The Neutrality Controversy of 1793–94
The neutrality controversy of 1793 illustrates that American statesmen
and jurists accepted the above framework of rights during war.  They were
just beginning to explore its implications in light of the Constitution’s separa-
tion powers.  While they agreed that war changed rights, they disagreed
about which institution had the power to recognize those changes.
In 1793, France and England were at war.  Americans split over whether
the United States had a treaty obligation to help France.  In April, President
George Washington issued an order declaring that the United States would
“adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent
Powers.”324  The order urged U.S. citizens to conduct their affairs accord-
ingly.  It warned citizens that the government would not protect them from
liability to the belligerent nations for violating neutrality.325  In fact it went
further, declaring that the President had instructed U.S. prosecutors “to
cause prosecutions to be instituted against all persons, who shall, within the
cognizance of the courts of the United States, violate the law of nations, with
respect to the Powers at war.”326
On its face, the Proclamation of Neutrality appears to assume that the
President had constitutional authority to determine whether other nations
were at war and whether the United States had any obligations under the law
of nations to one of the belligerents.  As we shall see, members of Congress
would contest this authority.  The proclamation also appears to assume that
during war the law of war was part of the law of the land.  Citizens prosecuted
and convicted of violations would be criminally liable.  It assumes, therefore,
that a state of war—even a war in which the United States was neutral—
changed individual rights under municipal law, but that those rights would
continue to be subject to due process.
324 Proclamation of Neutrality (1793), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS 140 (Wal-
ter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1833).
325 Id.
326 Id.
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As to how the law of war would become the law of the land, however, the
proclamation is ambiguous.  The President’s instructions to U.S. prosecutors
could be read as (1) assuming that the law of nations was inherently part of
the general federal law and therefore “within the cognizance of the courts of
the United States”;327 (2) violations of neutrality were within those courts’
“cognizance” to the extent they chose to adopt the law of nations; (3) such
“cognizance” depended upon a statutory grant of jurisdiction and definition
of crime; or (4) some combination of the above.  What the “cognizance of
the courts” qualification seems to foreclose is the idea that the President,
through his prosecutors, would have the authority to decide which crimes
under the law of nations would be cognizable in federal courts.328
Alexander Hamilton and James Madison famously debated the Presi-
dent’s authority to issue the proclamation.  Their constitutional dispute was
narrow.  As framed by Hamilton, the question was whether the President’s
executive power entails the power to determine that the nation has a treaty
obligation to maintain neutrality in the absence of a congressional declara-
tion of war.329  Madison argued that the Declare War Clause gave Congress
sole authority to determine on war or peace.330  Framed this way, Hamilton’s
claim for presidential power was imminently practical and, by modern stan-
dards, modest.
The standard analysis of their debate overlooks Hamilton and Madison’s
shared presumption of the foregoing legal framework.  Madison’s argument
proceeds from the basic legal implications of war discussed above.  Declaring
war, he argues:
[H]as the effect of repealing all the laws operating in a state of peace, so far
as they are inconsistent with a state of war; and of enacting, as a rule for the
executive, a new code adapted to the relation between the society and its for-
eign enemy.  In like manner, a conclusion of peace annuls all the laws pecu-
liar to a state of war, and revives the general laws incident to a state of
peace.331
From this premise, he concludes that the power of declaring war, and,
by implication, to determine peace, is a legislative, i.e., lawmaking power, and
therefore cannot be considered an “executive” power vested in the
President.332
327 Id.
328 Congress would enact legislation defining these crimes. See Neutrality Act of 1794,
ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381.
329 Hamilton, supra note 252, at 405–06.
330 Madison, supra note 283, at 151.
331 Madison, supra note 283, at 145; see id. at 146 (“These remarks will be strengthened
by adding, that treaties, particularly treaties of peace, have sometimes the effect of chang-
ing not only the external laws of the society, but operate also on the internal code, which is
purely municipal, and to which the legislative authority of the country is of itself compe-
tent and complete.”).
332 Id. at 151; see also James Madison, Helvidius No. 2, reprinted in Madison, supra note
283, at 151–60.
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Hamilton seems to agree that war changes the law.  This point is crucial
to his argument.  The President, as executive, has a duty to see that the laws
be faithfully executed—“all laws, the laws of nations, as well as the municipal
law which recognizes and adopts those laws.”333  Because of this duty, the
President is bound to execute “the laws of neutrality when the country is in a
neutral position.”334  Even more:
Our treaties, and the laws of nations, form a part of the law of the land.  He,
who is to execute the laws, must first judge for himself of their meaning.  In
order to the observance of that conduct which the laws of nations, combined
with our treaties, prescribed to this country, in reference to the present war
in Europe, it was necessary for the president to judge for himself, whether
there was any thing in our treaties, incompatible with an adherence to
neutrality.335
The President thus had a duty to interpret the existing laws—including
the treaty with France—to ascertain the scope of his duty to execute the law
of the land.  Far from changing the law of the land, Hamilton asserts, the
proclamation simply informed the citizens that the laws of neutrality that had
been “previously established . . . will be put in execution against the
infractors of them.”336  Here Hamilton suggests that the proclamation
threatened only the prosecution of laws of neutrality that had already been
adopted into the law of the land, either by statute or judicial decision.
Given the existence of the treaty as part of the law of the land, the Presi-
dent’s duty to enforce it, and Congress’s silence up to that point, Hamilton’s
modest claim of presidential authority stemming from the duty to execute
the law seems impeccable.  But what is most remarkable about the arguments
marshalled by both Hamilton and Madison is that they presume that a state
of war or neutrality changed not only the law between nations, but the law of
the land.  War did not place this law outside the ordinary constitutional sepa-
ration of powers or unmoor it from the requirements of due process.
Indeed, Hamilton’s tacit acknowledgment that citizens would be liable only
for crimes that had been previously established by law seems to agree with
Madison’s major premise that persons could be punished only according to
the law of the land—even when that law had changed due to a change in the
nation’s status of war and peace.
B. Ware v. Hylton
In 1796, the Supreme Court decided Ware v. Hylton,337 a case Justice
Iredell called “the greatest Cause which ever came before a Judicial Court in
333 Madison, supra note 283, at 157.
334 Hamilton, supra note 252, at 408.
335 Id. at 410.
336 Id.
337 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
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the World.”338  The question was whether a Virginia statute had eliminated
the debt owed by Americans to British creditors, and if so, whether the Treaty
of Paris had nullified that law.339  The Justices agreed that it had.340  The
case illustrates how early American jurists reasoned about rights during war
based on the relationship between the law of nations and America’s new con-
stitutional system.  The deprivation of enemy rights during war would be sub-
ject to U.S. law, and, given the separation of the judicial branch from the
legislative and executive powers, the lawfulness of those deprivations would
be subject to judicial review.
The case presented two principal questions.341  The first was whether
the Virginia Sequestration Act of 1777, which purported to sequester, or con-
fiscate, debts owed to enemy aliens, had been lawful when Virginia enacted
it.342  The Justices’ conclusion—that the Virginia Sequestration Act was law-
ful when enacted—is less important for our purposes than the Justices’ train
of logic.  The first issue to resolve was whether a sovereign has a right under
the law of war to confiscate the debt of enemy aliens.  Justices Chase and
Iredell cited many authorities to support their conclusion that a sovereign
has a right to confiscate enemy property (including debt) during war.343
They also cited a 1699 case from the Court of Exchequer holding that the
Crown had a right to confiscate the property of enemy aliens, but only by an
inquest that reached a judgment before the peace.344  Justice Wilson,
though, argued that the recent practice of European nations was against con-
fiscation of enemy debt,345 and that “[w]hen the United States declared their
independence, they were bound to receive the law of nations, in its modern
state of purity and refinement.”346
The next question was whether the Commonwealth of Virginia had the
right to confiscate enemy property.  Chase maintained that Virginia had the
exclusive right to confiscate British property within its territory,347 at least
before it vested such authority in the Confederation Congress.348  He then
338 7 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
1789–1800, at 203 (Maeva Marcus ed., 2003) [hereinafter DHSC] (emphasis omitted)
(quoting remarks from Jeremiah Smith made to William Plumer (Feb 7, 1795)).
339 Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 199–200; see 7 DHSC, supra note 338, at 203; see also Georgia
v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794) (resolving a dispute over British debts sequestered
but not confiscated by Georgia).
340 Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 284–85 (opinion of Cushing, J.).
341 Id. at 208.
342 9 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 337
(William W. Hening ed., Richmond, J & G Cochran Printers 1821).
343 Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 225–29 (opinion of Chase, J.); id. at 262 (opinion of Iredell,
J.).
344 Id. at 227–28 (opinion of Chase, J.); id. at 263–64 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
345 See id. at 281 (opinion of Wilson, J.).
346 Id. (emphasis omitted).
347 Id. at 231 (opinion of Chase, J.).
348 See id. (suggesting that the states retained at least some of the powers of war under
the law of nations).
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distinguished between the internal and external aspects of the law of nations.
In implementing the law of nations through its own municipal law, the state
was subject to its “[c]onstitution[al], or fundamental law.”349  Chase was not
clear about what this law might require.  But he concluded that the Virginia
Sequestration Act did not violate it.350  From an external viewpoint, if the law
were understood to violate the law of nations, Virginia “was answerable in her
political capacity to the British nation, whose subjects have been injured in
consequence of that law.”351  For both Chase and Iredell, this was an impor-
tant point: even if the statute was a violation of the law of nations, insofar as
the Virginia Sequestration Act was consistent with municipal law, it was still
the law of the land.352  Recourse for municipal laws contrary to the law of
nations was to diplomacy, not to the courts of law.
The foregoing dispute among the Justices was over how the law of
nations had been adopted into U.S. law.  Which American institution, at least
at the time the debtor had paid the Commonwealth of Virginia, had the con-
stitutional authority under the law of nations to confiscate enemy property?
About twenty years later the same question would reemerge in a case about
the separation of national powers.353
The “great question” in Ware, however, was not about Virginia’s original
authority under the law of nations, but whether the Treaty of Paris nullified
the Virginia statute.354  All of the Justices agreed that it did.355  According to
the U.S. Constitution, the Treaty of Paris was part of the “supreme Law of the
Land”356 and therefore governed disputes over private rights, overriding “all
State laws upon the subject, to all intents and purposes.”357  The Justices
agreed that Article IV of the Treaty of Paris could not have been more clearly
on point: “Creditors on either side shall meet with no lawful impediment to
the recovery of the full value in sterling money, of all bona fide debts hereto-
fore contracted.”358  As Chief Justice John Jay had written in his circuit court
opinion, if the Virginia Sequestration Act were not “[a] lawful impediment to
[plaintiff’s] recovery of the full value”359 of the debt, “I cannot conceive why
349 Id. at 223 (opinion of Chase, J.) (emphasis omitted).
350 See id.  Chief Justice Jay believed that the law of nations limited Virginia’s constitu-
tional power to affect the rights of “the subject of foreign powers residing out of their juris-
diction in foreign parts.”  7 DHSC, supra note 338, at 304 (emphasis added).
351 Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 224 (opinion of Chase, J.) (emphasis omitted).
352 Id.; see also id. at 265 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
353 See Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814); infra Section V.D.
354 Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 282 (opinion of Cushing, J.).
355 Id. at 284–85.  Justice Iredell believed the Sequestration Act transferred the debtor’s
obligation to the state; the Treaty of Paris protected the creditor’s rights, but those rights
were now against the state. See Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 278–79 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
356 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
357 Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 282 (opinion Cushing, J.).
358 Id. (emphasis omitted) (internal quotes omitted); see also id. at 244 (opinion of
Chase, J.); id. at 251 (opinion of Paterson, J.); id. at 281 (opinion Wilson, J.); 7 DHSC,
supra note 338, at 306 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
359 Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 239 (opinion of Chase, J.) (emphasis omitted).
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it was pleaded [by defendant] as a bar” to the suit.360  Allowing the debtor to
avoid his obligation to the British creditor, therefore, would quite literally
violate the “supreme law of the land.”361  The deprivation of the property
rights of enemy aliens during war was subject to the law of the land and
judicial review.
C. The Alien Acts of 1798
By 1798, the nation’s relationship with France had greatly deteriorated.
French vessels openly engaged in hostilities against U.S. vessels.  Federalists
and Democratic-Republicans hotly disputed the appropriate response to the
crisis.  To protect national security without the decisive step of declaring war,
Federalists in Congress enacted the Alien Enemy Act of 1798, the Alien
Friends Act, and the Sedition Act of 1798.362  Americans made a wide range
of constitutional arguments for and against these Acts, many of them based
on inconsistent theories about the Constitution’s protection of aliens and
application during war.363  The debates therefore reveal competing views of
the Constitution’s meaning during war.  Yet many of these views, especially
those of the Democratic-Republicans who virtually swept the next elections in
the so-called “Revolution of 1800,” are entirely consistent with the foregoing
account of due process during war.  Moreover, federal and state courts enter-
tained habeas and damages suits to ensure that the detention of enemy aliens
was lawful.
1. Congressional Debate over the Alien Enemy Act
The Alien Enemy Act provided that upon invasion or a declaration of
war the President would have the power to arrest and remove alien ene-
mies.364  Congressional debate over the constitutionality of the Act was rela-
tively narrow.  Everyone appeared to believe that the nation could detain and
remove enemy aliens during war and that the Constitution assigned the
power to authorize such detention and removal to Congress.365  This agree-
ment was far from obvious or petty.  Deprivations of rights of enemy noncom-
batants would be according to law, not executive fiat.
Democratic-Republicans defeated two early provisions of the bill on the
strength of constitutional arguments advanced by Albert Gallatin based on
the application of the Bill of Rights to the exercise of war powers.  One provi-
sion would have authorized the detention of anyone who harbored an enemy
360 7 DHSC, supra note 338, at 308 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
361 Id. at 294.
362 Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596; Alien Enemy Act of 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577;
Alien Friends Act of 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570, 570–71.
363 See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS 256–58 (1997); Neuman,
supra note 54, at 927–43.
364 Alien Enemy Act of 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577.
365 See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1790–91 (1798); see also id. at 1790 (statement of Rep.
Sewall).
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alien subject to detention and removal.  Gallatin argued that this would allow
“certain persons [to] be deprived of their liberty without any process of law,
or being guilty of any crime.”366  While Gallatin was here concerned for the
rights of nonenemies, his argument shows that he believed the Bill of Rights
to apply to the war powers.367  He likewise argued that a provision authoriz-
ing the President to retaliate against enemy aliens for “unusual severities”
committed by an enemy sovereign against U.S. citizens would “train our code
of law in a manner expressly contrary to the spirit of our Constitution, which
expressly declares no ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ shall be inflicted.”368
These arguments were consistent with the foregoing legal framework.
During war, Congress could implement the nation’s rights under the law of
nations to change the rights of resident enemy aliens, in particular to author-
ize their detention or removal without the ordinary requirements of due pro-
cess.  As we shall see, federal and state courts believed that the detention of
enemy aliens was subject to judicial review.  But Congress could not authorize
the detention of nonenemy aliens without ordinary procedural protections.
2. Debates over the Alien Friends Act
The Alien Friends Act was another kettle of fish.  Disagreements over its
constitutionality were deep and broad.  The Act was not a war measure, so
the debates are not directly relevant to the understanding of due process
during war.  Some of the arguments against the Act seem to imply that ene-
mies are not entitled to constitutional rights, yet as we shall see, these argu-
ments square with the legal framework of due process during war presented
above.
The Alien Friends Act authorized the President to identify, detain, and
remove aliens “dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States” and
those suspected of “treasonable or secret machinations against the govern-
ment” whose sovereigns were not at war with the United States.369  It was
meant to authorize the President to detain and remove French subjects with-
out a declaration of war against France, but it applied during war and peace
to any nonenemy alien deemed by the President to be dangerous or sus-
pected of disloyalty.  Federalists defended the Act as an exercise of Con-
gress’s power over naturalization, the “sovereign authority of a nation” over
366 Id. at 1788–89 (statement of Rep. Gallatin).
367 See id. at 1980 (statement of Rep. Gallatin) (“Congress could dispose of the persons
and property of alien enemies as it thinks fit, provided it be according to the laws of
nations and to treaties.”).  Gallatin could be read as holding that Congress’s power over
enemy aliens was bound only by the law of nations and not by the Bill of Rights.  This
would conflict with his view, discussed above, that harsh retaliation against enemy aliens
would violate at least the spirit of the Eighth Amendment.  An equally plausible reading is
that Gallatin believed that the law of nations provided the minimum process of law to
which alien enemies were entitled.
368 Id. at 1794 (statement of Rep. Gallatin) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VIII).
369 Alien Friends Act of 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570, 570–71.
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immigration,370 and the federal government’s authority over foreign affairs
and war.371
Opponents of the bill had to distinguish it from the Alien Enemy Act,
which they generally supported.  To do so, they distinguished the constitu-
tional status of alien friends and enemies.  Their principal argument was that
Congress had power over enemy aliens because of its power over war,372 but
had no power over the removal of alien friends.373  They also argued that the
bill gave the President too much legislative and judicial power over “danger-
ous” aliens,374 and that it ran afoul of the Bill of Rights.375
Two notes: The Federalists could have argued that the Alien Friends Act
was an exercise of the war powers and therefore was not subject to the Bill of
Rights.  They didn’t.  That argument would have been odd, since the Alien
Friends Act was expressly about friends, rather than enemies, but some Fed-
eralists did appear to ground Congress’s authority to enact the law in part on
Congress’s authority over war.376  Had they believed that the belligerent-sov-
ereign dichotomy placed the Alien Friends Act outside the Bill of Rights, they
surely would have said so.  Rather, Federalists tended to respond to charges
that the Alien Friends Act violated the Due Process Clause by arguing that
aliens do not enjoy any constitutional rights, or, more moderately, that the
right to remain in the United States is not part of the “life, liberty, or prop-
erty” subject to due process.377
370 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2018 (1798) (statement of Rep. Otis).
371 Id. at 2016 (statement of Rep. Kittera).
372 See H.D. Resolutions of Virginia of December 21st, 1798, the Debate and Vote
Thereon (Va. 1798), reprinted in THE VIRGINIA REPORT OF 1799–1800, at 22, 39 (Richmond,
J.W. Randolph 1850) [hereinafter Virginia Resolutions] (statement of Del. Ruffin); H.D.
Report of 1799 (Va. 1799), reprinted in THE VIRGINIA REPORT OF 1799–1800, supra, at 189,
207 [hereinafter Report of 1799] (“[T]he removal of alien enemies is an incident to the
power of war; . . . the removal of alien friends, is not an incident to the power of war.”).
373 See H.R. Resolutions of Kentucky Legislature of 10th November (Ky. 1798), reprinted
in THE VIRGINIA REPORT OF 1799–1800, supra note 372, at 162, 163–64 [hereinafter Ken-
tucky Resolutions]; Virginia Resolutions, supra note 372, at 39.
374 See Kentucky Resolutions, supra note 373, at 163–64; Virginia Resolutions, supra
note 372, at 23.
375 See Kentucky Resolutions, supra note 373, at 164; Virginia Resolutions, supra note
372, at 25 (Rep. Taylor) (noting that alien friends were entitled to life, liberty, and prop-
erty, and trial by jury); id. at 88 (Rep. Daniel) (citing Vattel for the proposition that alien
friends are entitled to the law of the land); see also 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1956, 1981–82
(1798) (statement of Rep. Gallatin); id. at 1983 (noting that the bill permitted deprivation
of “civil rights, the personal liberty, [and] the property of aliens . . . upon suspicion, and
. . . at the will of one man”); id. at 2011–12; id. at 1995–96 (statement of Rep. Williams).
376 See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2018 (1798) (statement of Rep. Otis). But see id. at 2018–19
(statement of Rep. Otis) (arguing that aliens enjoy protection of the Constitution and
laws).
377 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2018–19 (1798) (statement of Rep.
Otis) (arguing that aliens enjoy protection of the Constitution and laws); Virginia Resolu-
tions, supra note 372, at 30–31, 34; Neuman, supra note 54, at 927 (discussing James
Madison and calling this the “mainstream” position).
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Second, it would be tempting to read the Democratic-Republican case
for the constitutional rights of alien friends to imply that alien enemies do not
have constitutional rights.  This would be putting words in their mouths.
They certainly justified the Alien Enemy Act by noting that enemies are sub-
ject to the law of nations and can therefore be handled differently than alien
friends, who are subject solely to the municipal law.  Therefore “the removal
of alien enemies, being conformable to the law of nations, is justified by the
Constitution: and the ‘act,’ for the removal of alien friends, being repugnant
to the constitutional principles of municipal law, is unjustifiable.”378  This
can be read to accord with the foregoing account of due process during war:
the process to which enemies were due was different because war changed
their rights and duties.
3. Habeas Corpus for Enemy Aliens
During the War of 1812, the President exercised his authority under the
Alien Enemy Act to require enemy aliens to register with a local marshal and
to remove to a place more than forty miles from the tidewater.379  Aliens who
refused were subject to detention.380  At least two sued for writs of habeas
corpus to challenge the lawfulness of their detention.  In both cases the
courts issued the writs, and upon their return, considered the merits of the
respective detainee’s case.
In Lockington’s Case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania concluded that
the statute authorized the petitioner’s detention.381  Justice Brackenridge
agreed with the result, but believed that the court lacked any authority to
take cognizance over the detention of an alien enemy; he believed that the
question of the lawfulness of the detention was only for the President.382  Yet
even he appeared to concede that the court could have ordered the release
of a detainee who could show he was not in fact an enemy.383  When Lock-
ington separately sued the marshal for trespass and false imprisonment in
federal court, Justice Bushrod Washington assumed that the plaintiff was
entitled to a damages award if he could show that the detention had been
unlawful.384
In an unreported case in the U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Vir-
ginia, Chief Justice John Marshall and District Judge St. George Tucker
ordered Thomas Williams released from the custody of the federal mar-
378 Report of 1799, supra note 372, at 206.
379 See FREDERICK C. BRIGHTLY, REPORTS OF CASES DECIDED BY THE JUDGES OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE COURT OF NISI PRIUS AT PHILADELPHIA, AND ALSO
IN THE SUPREME COURT 271 (Philadelphia, James Kay, Jun. & Bros. 1851).
380 Id.
381 Id. at 280–82 (opinion of Tilghman, C.J.); id. at 290–91 (opinion of Yeates, J.).
382 Id. at 295–96 (opinion of Brackenridge, J.).
383 See id. at 298.
384 See Lockington v. Smith, 15 F. Cas. 758 (C.C.D. Pa. 1817) (No. 8488); see also
Neuman, supra note 54, at 994.
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shal.385  The reason is unclear.  The court records reveal only that the court
believed that “the regulations made by the President of the United States
respecting alien enemies, do not authorize the confinement of the petitioner
in this case.”386  A newspaper reported that Marshall ordered Williams
released because the marshal had not assigned a place to which he should
relocate.387  At a minimum, it seems clear that the court based its judgment
on something other than the jurisdictional fact that Williams was not an
enemy alien.  Rather, like the Pennsylvania court, the federal judges appear
to have believed they had a duty to decide whether the law and executive
order authorized the detention.  This is a far cry from the view that enemies
are not entitled to the protection of the laws.
Interestingly, some American judges, like Chancellor Kent in New York,
interpreted the Alien Enemy Act to tacitly authorize resident enemy aliens to
sue and be sued in U.S. courts until Congress or the President expressly
removed that authorization.388  Whatever the common law would have
required (and Kent believed the enemy alien disability was all but a dead
letter in England),389 under the supreme law of the land, resident alien ene-
mies had a defeasible right to sue and be sued.390  While this does not
directly support the notion that alien enemies were entitled to due process of
law, it strongly suggests that they were not generally outside the protection of
the laws.  Rather, by the early republic, enemy aliens were entitled to the
protection of the law, but the nation had the right under the law of nations
to diminish their rights during war.  When it did so, as the habeas cases show,
it was bound to do so by law.
Moreover, courts also did not hesitate to order the release of U.S. citi-
zens unlawfully detained by the military on allegations of treason or espio-
nage,391 or to award damages against the officers who unlawfully detained
them.392  The presidential powers to command the armed forces and prose-
cute a general war did not include the power to detain citizens on suspicion
385 See Gerald L. Neuman & Charles F. Hobson, John Marshall and the Enemy Alien, 9
GREEN BAG 2D 39, 41–42 (2005).
386 Id. at 42.
387 See id. at 41–42.  This was how Judge Brackenridge, in Lockington’s Case, interpreted
the reports he had read of Marshall’s judgment. See BRIGHTLY, supra note 379, at 296–97.
Thomas Williams’s attorney reportedly argued that the court’s duty was “constitutionally to
interpret the Laws of the Land, and not to give too much power, into the hands of any
ministerial officer where there was a judicial power.”  Neuman & Hobson, supra note 385,
at 41 (emphasis omitted).
388 See Clarke v. Morey, 10 Johns. 69 (N.Y. 1813).
389 Id. at 70–72.
390 See Hutchinson v. Brock, 11 Mass. (10 Tyng) 119, 122 (1814) (distinguishing the
rights of a resident and a nonresident enemy alien).
391 See Smith v. Shaw, 12 Johns. 257 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815); In re Stacy, 10 Johns. 328 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1813); Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, The President’s Power to Detain “Enemy Combatants”:
Modern Lessons from Mr. Madison’s Forgotten War, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1567, 1580–85 (2004).
392 See M’Connell v. Hampton, 12 Johns. 234 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815); see also Mitchell v.
Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851) (holding that U.S. citizen had trespass action
against U.S. officer for conduct in Mexico during the Mexican-American War).
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of violating the purely municipal laws of treason and espionage, and courts
would provide remedies when the President sought to assert martial law over
those outside its jurisdiction.393
D. Prize Cases
The early federal court prize cases are an important example of the pro-
vision of due process of law to enemies and neutrals during war.  U.S. jurists
understood that the law of nations entered U.S. law through the Constitu-
tion, acts of Congress, and, residually, as part of the general law of the
land.394  Courts ensured that the executive deprived an enemy or neutral of
property rights on the high seas only according to the law of the land.
Importantly, courts interpreted the congressional authorization of captures
and condemnations especially strictly when made during a partial war, rather
than when the nation was engaged in a general war.
Scholars have given ample attention to the U.S. prize cases beginning
with the quasi war with France and continuing through the U.S. Civil War,395
but none, to my knowledge, have considered those cases to illustrate the
application of due process.396  This is understandable.  Courts sometimes
wrote as if the Due Process Clause was principally a criminal procedure pro-
tection.397  The prize cases proceeded according to admiralty rules of proce-
dure, and no one thought they should have proceeded according to ordinary
criminal procedures.398  Moreover, prize courts in all maritime nations
emphasized that they sat as courts of the law of nations.399  They applied the
law of prize that was part of the customary law of war.400  In broad strokes, at
least, that law was understood to govern all captures on the high seas.
But prize courts were also municipal courts of justice applying municipal
law.401  U.S. courts in particular understood that the prize law they applied
was subject to the Constitution,402 and, because the Constitution assigned
authority over prizes and captures on the high seas to Congress,403 to legisla-
393 See Mitchell, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 135; see also infra Section V.E.
394 See The Rapid, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 155, 162 (1814) (the law of prize “was the law of
England before the revolution, and therefore constitutes a part of the admiralty and mari-
time jurisdiction conferred on this Court in pursuance of the constitution”).
395 See, e.g., The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815); Thirty Hogshead of Sugar v.
Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191 (1815); The Sally, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 382 (1814); The Rapid,
12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 155.
396 See 2 GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN
MARSHALL, 1801–15, at 407–53 (1981); Kent, supra note 13.
397 See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 304–05 (1870).
398 See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, NOTES ON THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF PRIZE COURTS
29–31 (Frederic Thomas Pratt ed., London, William Benning & Co. 1854); WHEATON,
supra note 62, at 319; supra Section II.C.
399 See STORY, supra note 398, at 76; WHEATON, supra note 62, at 319.
400 See WHEATON, supra note 62, at 319.
401 See supra subsection II.C.2.
402 See supra subsection II.C.2.
403 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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tion.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court declined to condemn vessels and
cargo that had been captured without congressional authority, and upheld
awards of damages for maritime trespass against the naval officers who made
unlawful captures on the high seas.404
Federal courts sometimes held executive officers to a narrow reading of
the congressional act purporting to authorize a capture.  During the
undeclared war with France during the 1790s, the Supreme Court distin-
guished between a “partial war” and a “general war.”405  The latter, the Jus-
tices said, is when the nation is in a state of war against another sovereign
under the law of nations.406  Being in a state of war authorized the nation to
exercise all the rights and duties of a belligerent.407  The implication was that
courts would interpret the President’s constitutional authority broadly dur-
ing a state of war to include the power to enforce the nation’s rights and
duties under the law of war, subject to congressional control.408
During a partial war, however, Congress exercised less than all of the
nation’s rights and duties under the law of war.409  In that case, the law of
war was not understood to be incorporated into U.S. law in toto.410  There-
fore, the President could enforce that law only insofar as Congress had
authorized him to do so.  During a partial war, then, the courts would read
the President’s authority to capture enemy and neutral vessels and cargo to
be governed by a strict interpretation of the law authorizing the capture.  In
Little v. Barreme, for instance, a U.S. warship captured a neutral vessel (believ-
ing it to be an American merchant) sailing from a French port.411  This was
consistent with the President’s instructions to the navy.412  But those instruc-
tions were broader than the Non-Intercourse Act on which the President
relied, which authorized captures only of vessels sailing to a French port.413
The Court ordered the vessel and cargo to be returned to the owner and
awarded damages against the officer.414
Even during a general war, the Court interpreted the President’s author-
ity under the law of nations narrowly when Congress had not unambiguously
incorporated it into the law of the United States.  In Brown v. United States,
404 See, e.g., Maley v. Shattuck, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 458 (1806); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 170 (1804); Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
405 See Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 40 (1800) (opinion of Washington, J.); id. at 43
(opinion of Chase, J.).
406 Id. at 40 (opinion of Washington, J.); id. at 43 (opinion of Chase, J.)
407 See id. at 43–44 (opinion of Chase, J.).
408 See id.
409 See id. at 40 (opinion of Washington, J.); id. at 43 (opinion of Chase, J.).
410 Id. at 40 (opinion of Washington, J.); id. at 43 (opinion of Chase, J.).
411 Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
412 See id. at 177.
413 Id. (citing An Act Further to Suspend the Commercial Intercourse Between the
United States and France, and the Dependencies Thereof, ch. 2, § 5, 5 Stat. 613, 615
(1799)).
414 Id. at 179; see also SOFAER, supra note 243, at 155–60 (noting that the Adams admin-
istration largely agreed with the Court’s interpretive approach).
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the government libeled the property of a British merchant found in the
United States shortly after the beginning of the war.415  Chief Justice Mar-
shall, writing for a majority, determined that the law of nations did not, of its
own force, authorize the capture.  “[M]odern usage,” he wrote, “is a guide
which the sovereign follows or abandons at his will.”416  Because the decision
to capture enemy property within the territory is a question of policy, “[i]t is
proper[ly] for the consideration of the legislature, not of the executive or
judiciary.”417  Justice Story dissented, arguing that Congress’s declaration of
war authorized the President to exercise all of the nation’s rights and duties
under the law of war, subject to congressional exception.  Since the law of
nations authorized the capture of enemy property, he would have held the
capture to be lawful.418  The dispute between the Justices was how specifically
Congress must speak before the law of war, at least with respect to the prop-
erty of enemy noncombatants, became the law of the land.  But none of them
disputed the fact that such a deprivation was ultimately subject to the law of
the land.  And, of course, the Court’s review was itself a provision of due
process.
E. Martial Law in New Orleans
In late 1814, General Andrew Jackson was preparing to defend New
Orleans from an imminent attack by the British.  To quell desertion and
other internal threats, he ordered martial law.419  He had no statutory
authority to do so.  A Louisiana legislator criticized the decision in a newspa-
per article.  Jackson ordered him arrested.  When the federal district judge
issued a writ of habeas corpus, Jackson ordered him arrested too.  The U.S.
attorney filed suit on the judge’s behalf in the state court.  Jackson arrested
the U.S. attorney and the state judge detaining them until official news of
peace arrived.420
Upon release, the federal judge ordered Jackson to show cause why he
should not be held in contempt of court.  As Jackson later argued to Presi-
dent Madison, “constitutional forms must be suspended, for the permanent
preservation of constitutional rights.”421  The judge disagreed.  He ordered
Jackson to pay $1000, and Jackson did.422
415 Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
416 Id. at 128.
417 Id. at 129.
418 Id. at 153–54 (Story, J., dissenting).
419 See SOFAER, supra note 243, at 333–36.
420 See id. at 333; see also MATTHEW WARSHAUER, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE POLITICS OF
MARTIAL LAW 20–26 (2006).
421 Letter from Alexander J. Dallas, Acting Sec’y, Dep’t of War, to Andrew Jackson,
Major Gen. (July 1, 1815), in 2 CORRESPONDENCE OF ANDREW JACKSON 212 (John Spencer
Bassett ed., 1927) [hereinafter Dallas Letter] (quoting remarks of Andrew Jackson).
422 See SOFAER, supra note 243, at 334.
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President Madison also disagreed with Jackson.  In a letter from Secre-
tary of War Alexander Dallas, the administration laid out its position.423
Madison’s view was nuanced.  On the one hand, he acknowledged that neces-
sity was the only plausible argument for ignoring the law of the land.  On the
other, he maintained that Jackson’s conduct was unlawful and clearly sup-
ported the judgment against him.424
[T]he case of necessity which creates it’s [sic] own Law, must not be con-
founded with the ordinary case of military service, prescribed and governed
by the established law of the land.  In the United States there exists no
authority to declare and impose Martial law, beyond the positive sanction of
the Acts of Congress.  To enforce the discipline and to ensure the safety, of
his garrison, or his camp, an American Commander possesses indeed, high
and necessary powers; but all his powers are compatible with the rights of
the citizens, and the independence of the judicial authority.  If, therefore,
he undertake to suspend the writ of Habeas Corpus, to restrain the liberty of
the Press, to inflict military punishments, upon citizens who are not military
men, and generally to supercede [sic] the functions of the civil Magistrate,
he may be justified by the law of necessity, while he has the merit of saving
his country, but he cannot resort to the established law of the land, for the
means of vindication.425
Madison thus subjected John Locke’s account of the executive’s emer-
gency power to the U.S. Constitution.426  War may justify a departure from
ordinary rights, but only Congress may authorize such a departure.  When
Congress has not authorized martial law, courts have a duty to provide due
process to enforce the law of the land.
If the established law of the land would not vindicate Jackson, what
would?  The people.  Decades later, when Jackson was penniless in retire-
ment, Congress voted to refund his contempt payment.427  Even the Demo-
crats who championed the bill insisted that it should not be construed as a
censure of the contempt order.428  Jackson’s defense of necessity had no
place in the law of the land, but it could, and did, succeed in the court of
public opinion.
VI. PRINCIPLES FOR THE WAR ON TERRORISM
The early history supports a framework for analyzing due process during
war.  The government’s deprivation of life, liberty, and property during war is
423 Dallas Letter, supra note 421, at 212–13.
424 See id. at 212.
425 Id. at 212–13.
426 See LOCKE, supra note 260, at 80 (“[I]t is fit that the laws themselves should in some
cases give way to the executive power, or rather to this fundamental law of nature and
government, viz., that as much as may be, all the members of the society are to be
preserved.”).
427 See WARSHAUER, supra note 420, at 78 (arguing that Jackson sought the refund in
part to remove the “blight” of Hall’s contempt order on his reputation).
428 Id. at 107, 109.
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subject to the law of the land.  Many but not all of those deprivations are
subject to the Due Process Clause, which requires review by a court according
to traditional judicial procedures to ensure that deprivations of rights comply
with the law of the land.  In particular, those held as POWs have a right to
challenge their status, and resident enemy aliens are entitled to due process
(though the government may change their underlying rights to liberty and
property by law).  Deprivations of rights on the battlefield, however, or under
a lawful suspension of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law are not
subject to due process.
This Article cannot analyze every deprivation of rights in the govern-
ment’s prosecution of the “war on terrorism,” but the historical framework
does suggest some principles.  The first is that all such deprivations are sub-
ject to U.S. law, whether or not they are subject to the Due Process Clause.
The executive department may deprive persons of life, liberty, or property
only according to statute or treaty.  The key source of such authority during
the war on terrorism is the Authorization for Use of Military Force of
2001.429  The statute provides the President with broad authority to engage
in hostilities against Al Qaeda and its affiliates.430
Second, many—but not all—of the executive’s deprivations of rights
pursuant to statutory authority are subject to the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.  Consider the government’s targeted killing program.
The DOJ emphasized a target’s citizenship and location to determine
whether due process applied, and to conclude that the executive branch’s
internal procedures were sufficient to satisfy the Fifth Amendment.  The
analysis under the foregoing framework is entirely different.  Whether the
killing is lawful depends on whether Congress authorized it.  Whether it is
subject to the Due Process Clause depends on whether it is akin to one that
would have traditionally been subject to due process.
Historically, deprivations of rights on a battlefield were not subject to
due process.  One of the legal challenges posed by the war on terror is that
there is no traditional battlefield and the enemy forces are not the regular
troops of another sovereign.  My own view is that the targeted killing of ter-
rorists affiliated with groups committed to attacking U.S. civilians is best anal-
ogized to the killing of an enemy soldier on a battlefield.  By planning attacks
against citizens outside of the parameters of a regular armed conflict, a ter-
rorist has put himself on a battlefield wherever he can be found.  Targeted
killings are therefore not subject to due process, though they are subject to
law.
429 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
430 See id. § 2 (“[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, com-
mitted, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored
such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terror-
ism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”).  For an analysis
of the statute, see generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authoriza-
tion and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2005).
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Yet because terrorists are not in a regular army there is a risk that the
government will target the wrong person.  Mistakes of fact on the battlefield
have always been an especially tragic part of war.  Yet the strategy of targeting
specific people changes the moral significance of a mistake about the target’s
identity.  Presumably, the government always has ample time to avoid such a
mistake.  Yet the chance remains.  If POWs could traditionally use habeas to
challenge their detention, why shouldn’t targets be able to use judicial proce-
dures to challenge being placed on a kill list?431  Put differently, a targeted
killing may not be subject to due process, but perhaps being put on a kill list
is.  There is simply no historical analogy for this.  A complete legal and pru-
dential analysis of such a holding is beyond this Article’s scope.  It is impor-
tant to note, however, that targeted killings are subject to law, and there are
ways besides judicial review to enforce the law and reduce errors.  Congress
can clarify the scope of statutory authority, eliminate funding for military
programs, and reimburse those the government has unlawfully (or mistak-
enly) deprived of rights.
Third, many deprivations of rights in the war on terrorism are subject to
the requirements of due process.  In particular, detainees are entitled to
some measure of judicial review to determine the lawfulness of their deten-
tion.  Once again, the traditional categories break down when applied to the
war on terrorism.  Historically, a sovereign would detain enemy soldiers as
POWs to exchange them for the sovereign’s own soldiers detained as POWs
by the enemy.432  Terrorist enemy combatants have no sovereign seeking
their exchange.  This is one reason their detentions have proven to be indefi-
nite.  Yet the risk of error that animated judicial review of a POW detainee’s
status applies with equal force to those held as enemy combatants in the war
on terrorism.
The Due Process Clause provides that those held within the jurisdiction
of U.S. courts are entitled to some measure of judicial review to ensure the
lawfulness of their detention.  Upon a detainee’s habeas petition, common-
law courts traditionally had great discretion over the procedures they would
use to determine the lawfulness of the detention of a POW.  Congress and
the President have little constitutional power to interfere with that judicial
review absent a constitutionally valid suspension of habeas corpus.  The fore-
going analysis therefore provides a more coherent and historically sound
doctrinal framework to support the plurality’s decision in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld.433
431 See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that al-Aulaqi’s
father was not entitled to enforce his son’s rights and that the targeting of a terrorist is a
political question).
432 See HALLIDAY, supra note 54, at 168.
433 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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CONCLUSION
In sum, the above historical analysis suggests that Americans at the
Founding understood deprivations of rights to be subject to U.S. law.
Many—but not all— of those deprivations were also subject to due process of
law.  Whether due process applied, and what it required, depended on the
nature of the right and the context.  The original understanding of due pro-
cess during war suggests a useful framework for analyzing the deprivation of
rights during the “war on terrorism” today.
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